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Chapter 1
Introduction to the dissertation
A central tenet in the electoral systems subfield is that parties and their members pursue
opportunities to advance partisan objectives via the strategic adoption of electoral rules.
This scholarly consensus exists for good reason: after all, partisans not only run for
office under a given set of electoral rules, but also, they populate the deliberative bodies
that make, as well as the administrative positions that maintain, them. While a focus
on parties is prudent, the purpose of this dissertation is to challenge the state of the
art by reconceptualizing electoral reform as a process that is more nuanced and richer
theoretically than the canonical partisan self-interest approach permits.
In the following chapters, I put partisan self-interest to the test by examining a range
of other, extra-partisan considerations that motivate political actors—whether elites or
the mass public—to favor the adoption of new electoral rules or the adaptation of existing
ones. Examples of such motivations include: the effect of geographic loyalty on support
for electoral college reform; of predispositional core values on support for absentee voting;
and, of nationalistic attitudes such as American exceptionalism on support for systemic
congressional and presidential electoral reform. The major contribution of this research is
that it presents a more accurate understanding of a process that is central to democratic
maintenance and renewal: while the (expected) partisan effect of a reform is indeed a
powerful motivation, actors possess—and chase through reform—predispositional and
attitudinal objectives other than those that are immediately partisan in nature.
1.1 Geographic self-interest and electoral reform
In Chapter 2, I investigate the extent to which geographic loyalty attenuates the effect
of partisan self-interest on support for electoral reform; as a case study, I focus on the
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National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) alternative to the electoral college.
The issue of electoral college reform provides fertile ground to look for evidence of loyalty
to geographic unit, because it is not neutral in its operation: it advantages marginal
and overrepresented states. As such, lawmakers from disadvantaged states are liable
to view a reform alternative more favorably than their co-partisans from advantaged
states. To obtain original data on the compact, I collected summarized bill histories for
every NPVIC bill introduced from 2006–14, using keyword searches of state legislatures’
websites, and then coded each bill on how far it advanced through the legislative process.
Drawing on a number of statistical approaches, including OLS and survival analysis,
I find strong evidence in favor of the extra-partisan motivation. First, and consistent
with the received wisdom that parties are key reformers, NPVIC is indeed a partisan
undertaking: when Democrats control state lawmaking, NPVIC advances further in the
legislative process than when Republicans are in charge. However, state-level features
(in particular marginality) that encourage preservation of the status quo attenuate the
relationship to the point where, in advantaged states, neither party is likely to assist
NPVIC. The balance is thus a modification to existing theory that directs scholars to
ask not only which party favors/opposes a reform, but also whether, within a given party,
there is a unanimity or diversity of opinion due to geography. This question is admittedly
secondary to the former, but it, too, is central to comprehending the dynamics of reform.
1.2 Core values and electoral reform
In Chapter 3, I focus on another extra-partisan motivation: predispositional core val-
ues, which are best thought of as constituting an actor’s understanding of the ‘common
good’—that is, her perception of what is beneficial for society as a whole rather than for
a narrow interest. Heretofore, core values: 1) have not been applied to the specific issue
of electoral rule choice; and more generally across issues, 2) have not been made to com-
2
pete against partisan self-interest. I fill each of these gaps with an original experimental
design that simultaneously manipulates the partisan- and values-implications of a ficti-
tious reform proposal on absentee voting. To operationalize core values, I use established
batteries on egalitarianism, moral tolerance, self-reliance, and economic individualism.
The focal topic of the electoral reform was absentee voting, a relatively non-biased (in
terms of perceived partisan advantage) electoral rule.
I fielded survey experiments via MTurk and Survey Sampling International (SSI),
coding each subject according to whether her treatment was congruent or incongruent
with her predispositional profile. A difference of means analysis reveals strong evidence
of a role for core values: not only do they have an important effect net of partisan
concerns, but also, core values dramatically attenuate the effect of partisan self-interest
in instances in which the predispositions have been made to countervail. The results,
then, not only further demonstrate that partisan self-interest provides a partial picture
of reform, but also display the underappreciated, general power of core values to wash
out partisan effects when the two predispositions are in opposition to each other.
1.3 American exceptionalism and electoral reform
In Chapter 4, I examine the relationship between attitudes of national affect—in the
form of American exceptionalism—and support for domestic electoral reform. I focus
on the proposed implementation of ‘foreign’ rules that have little-to-no history in the
U.S.—e.g., the Fair Representation Act (FRA), a proposed switch from single-member
pluralitarian to multi-member congressional districts using Irish-style single-transferable
vote (STV); and, the Equal Vote Amendment (EVA), a proposed abandonment of the
electoral college in favor of French-style two-round runoff. Because individuals who
believe in American exceptionalism by definition view the U.S. as being ‘superior’ to
other nations, as well as having a ‘mission’ to spread American-style democracy abroad,
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I theorize that exceptionalists should be more likely than non-exceptionalists to oppose
the importation to the U.S. of other countries’ rules.
To gauge the mass public’s attitudes on exceptionalism, I developed an original, eight-
item survey battery with a colleague, using MTurk (note: this paper is not part of the
dissertation); this battery operationalizes both the special character and special mission
sub-pieces of the exceptionalism concept. On a second MTurk survey, I paired this bat-
tery with vignettes about the FRA and EVA, with the treatment for each framing the
focal alternative as a “foreign import,” “used in Europe,” and “out-of-place in America.”
The idea here is that, because exceptionalism is not randomly distributed among the pop-
ulation, we must randomly prime some respondents to have these considerations at the
top of their minds when evaluating the dependent variable (i.e., support for the electoral
alternative). This design allows me to convert the association between exceptionalism
and support for reform into a causal story.
Although I find initial evidence that the relationship between the two variables is
indeed negative (i.e., as exceptionalist sentiments increase, support for the reform de-
creases), a multiplicative model that interacts treatment assignment with exceptionalism
yields a muddled result: while the treatment behaves as theorized, the difference between
treatment group and control group is not statistically distinguishable. This is likely be-
cause the control group was accidentally ‘treated’ with pre-stimulus content about affect
for the U.S. I conclude this chapter, therefore, with a discussion of changes one could make
to the survey design, in order to avoid this problem. In future, post-dissertation work,
I plan—once having established the effect of exceptionalism on electoral rule choice—to
countervail this attitude with partisan self-interest, as in Chapters 2 and 3.
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Chapter 2
Competing group loyalties in electoral reform:
An analysis of the U.S. electoral college
2.1 Introduction to the chapter
On December 7, 2011, then-Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R–KY) joined a
small audience at the Heritage Foundation for a seminar on the National Popular Vote
Interstate Compact (NPVIC), a proposed subnational reform to the electoral college
in which states agree to commit their electoral votes, as a unit, to the winner of the
aggregate, national popular vote.1 Four months earlier, in August, NPVIC had enjoyed
a milestone victory when the country’s most populous state, California, had agreed
to join the compact; due to this breakthrough, the proposal appeared to be gathering
momentum at a critical time—just ahead of the 2012 presidential election. A proponent of
the electoral college status quo, McConnell described the compact as “the most important
issue in America nobody’s talking about,” a “dangerous” and “absurd” scheme Democratic
lawmakers and activists were “sneak[ing] through” under cover of metaphorical darkness.
“They are as well-funded, unfortunately, as they are well-organized, and they are getting
close to the finish line,” McConnell warned, calling Republicans to arms. “We need to kill
[NPVIC] in the cradle before it grows up.” His message was clear: Democratic tinkering
with electoral rules must be stopped.2
1 I would like to thank Larry Bartels, Gabriel Camargo-Toledo, Josh Clinton, Oscar Castorena,
David Lewis, Scott Limbocker, Kristen Michelitch, and Mark Richardson for their helpful comments.
Last presented at MPSA 2017. This chapter has been published in Electoral Studies; see, bibliography
for full citation.
2 Tom Curry, “McConnell Warns of Popular Vote ‘Catastrophic Outcome’,” NBC News, 7
Dec. 2011, http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/12/07/9280257-mcconnell-warns-of-popular-
vote-catastrophic-outcome; Eliza Newlin Carney, “GOP Nonprofit Backs Electoral College,” Roll Call,
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McConnell’s decision to highlight the Democrat-against-Republican contours of the
electoral college reform debate certainly would not have astonished a political scientist.
A central tenet in the discipline is that, because the choice of one electoral rule over
another—and, more generally, of one institutional arrangement over an alternative—can
affect who wins and who loses (Duverger, 1959; Lijphart, 1995; North, 1990; Powell and
Vanberg, 2000; Rae, 1967), actors face incentives to strategically adopt (and adapt) elec-
toral rules in order to advance their goals (Benoit, 2007; Boix, 1999; Bowler et al., 2006;
Colomer, 2005; Renwick, 2010; but see Andrews and Jackman, 2005; Shvetsova, 2003, on
the uncertain mapping of preferences into outcomes). Although previous studies have
identified a range of potential electoral reformers, from colonial powers to international
organizations to non-political experts, scholars tend to view “goal-seeking” political par-
ties as the “conscious and purposive” engines that power institutional change (Benoit,
2007, p.370–72). Indeed, more than any other group, political parties not only are af-
fected deeply by the zero-sum nature of electoral rules (i.e., one party’s gain in legislative
seats or executive offices is at the expense of another’s), but their members also populate
the very deliberative bodies often tasked with making and maintaining the system of
rules that govern elections. Political parties are thus well-invested (i.e., motivated) and
well-positioned (i.e., empowered) to act as electoral reformers (Benoit, 2004).
While a focus on parties (and their partisan members) is prudent, the extant lit-
erature within the electoral reform subfield has tended to neglect an obvious, but oft-
unoperationalized, qualifier: electoral rules not only distribute power among parties, but
among geographic units, as well. If, within a party, the partisan and geographic interests
of a subset of members conflict, then electoral rule choice may set the stage for intra-
party conflict. A lawmaker, for example, is a representative of a geographic unit and of
a party; as such, she has two loyalties to which she must be responsive. If the policy
7 Dec. 2011, http://www.rollcall.com/news/GOP-Nonprofit-Backs-Electoral-College-210872-1.html.
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positions of her two allegiances align, then the management of concurrent loyalties is a
non-issue. However, and importantly, if the policy positions of the two groups pull in
opposite directions (e.g., her party supports reform alternative x whereas the geographic
unit she represents, i.e., her state, seeks preservation of the status quo), then the man-
agement of concurrent loyalties can be particularly effortful. In the case of the latter, the
relationship between partisan loyalty and electoral rule choice surely depends upon the
conflict variable, thus rendering partisan interest but a partial explanation: it can only
account for inter -party differences, when intra-party differences, due to geography, may
be just as necessary to understand.
Indeed, Leyenaar and Hazan (2011, p.443) and Blais and Shugart (2008) have each
argued that the electoral reform subfield should explore the extent to which parties be-
have as non-unitary actors, a modification to existing theory that directs scholars to
ask not only which party favors/opposes the reform, but also whether, within a given
party, there is a unanimity or diversity of opinion. In the paper that follows, I test
this conditional, ‘competing loyalties hypothesis’ in the United States with an original
dataset on the aforementioned National Popular Vote Interstate Compact. Electoral col-
lege reform is, I argue, a fruitful place to look for a conflict between partisan loyalty and
other attachments, because the institution’s tendency to advantage certain states over
others makes salient geographic allegiances and thus activates a second group interest.
Although such systemic benefits (or, depending on one’s framing preference, biases) are
numerous, the literature on the normative desirability of the electoral college routinely
spotlights two as being particularly valuable (critics of these distortions include Bennett,
2006; Dahl, 2003, ch.4; Edwards, 2011; and, Longley and Braun, 1972; for a defense, see
Best, 1975; Ross, 2004). First, the electoral college advantages less populous states in
its apportionment of electors, because of the so-called constant two or senatorial bump
(henceforth, overrepresentation). Second, and most notably, the electoral college advan-
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tages closely-divided swing states (or battlegrounds) at the expense of states that reliably
(and overwhelmingly) vote for one major party over the other (henceforth, marginality).3
Because the electoral college “clearly does not operate as a neutral mechanism” (Lon-
gley and Braun, 1972, p.95), there is reason to expect that, within a party, lawmakers
from swing states and small states—unlike their co-partisan colleagues from safe states
and large states—should face incentives to defend the electoral college status quo from
a reform alternative. In the analysis that follows, I find evidence in support of both the
canonical partisan and the competing loyalties hypotheses. First, and consistent with the
received wisdom that parties are key reformers, NPVIC is indeed a partisan undertaking:
the bill advances furthest in the legislative process when Democrats control state law-
making. However, the swing state distortion—as a feature that encourages preservation
of the status quo—attenuates the relationship to the point where, in advantaged states,
even Democrats are unlikely to assist NPVIC; the result of the small state distortion,
while in the theorized direction, does not rise to traditional levels of significance.
Ultimately, this research makes two contributions. Most importantly, my findings
speak to the growing literature on electoral reform: by highlighting circumstances under
which alternative, geographic-based loyalties might cause intra-party defections to occur,
I demonstrate that the relationship between partisan interest and electoral rule choice
is indeed nuanced. Second, this project is the first systematic treatment of the National
Popular Vote Interstate Compact, a proposal that—whatever outcome the future holds—
history should record as a seminal moment in the saga of electoral college reform. The
dataset I have assembled, which includes every NPVIC bill introduced in the country
3 Other distortions include : 1) the apportionment of electors is based upon population rather than
voter turnout; and, 2) the apportionment of electors takes 10 years to respond to population changes.
In the analysis that follows, I do not operationalize either of these two distortions, as each receives little
attention relative to the small state and swing state distortions and is thus unlikely to provide a salient
state interest.
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between 2006 and 2014, should also be a useful empirical source to future electoral college
scholars (and even more so now that the 2016 election result has made NPVIC newly
relevant). In Section 2.2, I briefly describe how NPVIC works. In the Section 2.3, I
review the literature on electoral reform and introduce hypotheses. Section 2.4 discusses
data and operationalizations, Section 2.5 presents results, and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 A brief overview of NPVIC
Throughout its history, the United States largely has eschewed changes to the mechanism
by which it selects its president. Today, as before, it utilizes an indirect method of elec-
tion: the electoral college. But just because the institution endures does not mean it lacks
critics who wish to alter or replace it. Reform-minded elites and activists have, over the
years, offered a range of alternatives; indeed, many of these proposals garnered consider-
ation before Congress and a handful of state legislatures before their national ambitions
fizzled (see Bugh, 2010a,b; Donovan and Bowler, 2004, ch.5; Korzi, 2010; Longley and
Braun, 1972). In general, we may classify a reform proposal to the electoral college by
two characteristics: first, whether it would abolish or merely modify the electoral college;
and second, whether its implementation would require a constitutional amendment.4
Unique among electoral college reform alternatives, the National Popular Vote In-
terstate Compact does not call for a constitutional amendment either to eliminate or
modify the electoral college. Rather, it proposes a backdoor route to a national popular
4 Four common proposals are: 1) the proportional plan (i.e., division of each state’s electoral votes
proportionally between candidates); 2) the district plan (i.e., division of each state’s electoral votes by
congressional district); 3) the bonus plan (i.e., unchanged allocation of state electoral votes but with
special top-up electors reserved for the national popular vote winner); and, 4) the direct vote plan (i.e.,
abolition of the electoral college in favor of a two-round runoff). Each plan would require a constitutional
amendment, either because it mandates a uniform allocation scheme for electors (proposals 1 and 2),
generates a new class of electors (proposal 3), or eliminates the institution entirely (proposal 4). See
Bugh (2010b); Haider-Markel et al. (2002); Korzi (2010); Longley and Braun (1972).
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State Electors Dem. share (%) Date joined compact State executive
Maryland 10 60.9% Apr. 10, 2007 Martin O’Malley (D)
New Jersey 14 56.7% Jan. 13, 2008 Jon Corzine (D)
Illinois 20 58.8% Apr. 7, 2008 Rod Blagojevich (D)
Hawaii 4 66.4% May 1, 2008 Linda Lingle (R)
Washington 12 56.7% Apr. 28, 2009 Christine Gregoire (D)
Massachusetts 11 62.6% Aug. 4, 2010 Deval Patrick (D)
District of Columbia 3 92.2% Dec. 7, 2010 Adrian Fenty (D)
Vermont 3 65.8% Apr. 22, 2011 Peter Shumlin (D)
California 55 59.7% Aug. 8, 2011 Jerry Brown (D)
Rhode Island 4 62.9% Jul. 12, 2013 Lincoln Chafee (D)
New York 29 63.4% Apr. 15, 2014 Andrew Cuomo (D)
Notes: Column 2 reports the current number of electors apportioned to each state (2010 Census), while column
3 displays the average Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote, 2004–12. In column 5, Lincoln Chafee
was, during much of the legislative process, a Democratic-leaning independent; he became a Democrat in May 2013.
Table 2.1: NPVIC member states by date of passage
vote for president by capturing the machinery of the electoral college and, essentially,
reprogramming it to the compact’s will. Somewhat humorously, NPVIC circumvents the
need for a constitutional amendment by utilizing two powers the Constitution reserves
for states. First, the Constitution grants each state sole discretion over how it will dis-
tribute its electoral votes among the candidates (Article II, Section 1, Clause 2). Second,
but more tenuously, Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 permits states to enter into interstate
agreements (or compacts) with each other.5 Thus, a state joins the compact and, as a
5 More precisely, Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 states that, “No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress. . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.” The Supreme Court has held,
however, that congressional approval is only necessary for an agreement that increases state power at the
expense of the national government. Opponents argue that NPVIC subverts a national institution and
is thereby unconstitutional pending Congress’ approval. Proponents have disputed this characterization
of the plan. See Amar (2011); Chang (2007); Gringer (2008); Muller (2007); Williams (2012).
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Figure 2.1: NPVIC membership by Democratic margin of the two-party vote
member, agrees to cast all of its electoral votes for the national popular vote plurality
winner, rather than its state popular vote plurality winner (if different). In that NPVIC
delivers a majority of electoral votes to the national popular vote winner, its design at-
tempts to prevent “wrong winner” presidents (i.e., those who have lost the popular vote,
or what the reform literature might term a “plurality reversal” or “systemic failure”; see
Blais and Shugart, 2008, p.188), such as in 2000 or 2016.6
6 As Gaines (2010) notes, NPVIC cannot guarantee an electoral college majority to the national
popular vote winner, because it does not eliminate faithless electors (i.e., those who vote contrary to
their pledge). If enough compact-controlled electors were to defect or blunder when casting their votes,
a deadlocked electoral college or a wrong winner result—however improbable—would be possible. In
the case of the former, the U.S. House would decide the election. See also, Bennett (2010).
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A caveat, however, is that NPVIC is a conditional or latent reform: it remains in-
operative until member states collectively reach the magic number of 270 electoral votes
under compact control (i.e., a majority of the electoral college). Once this threshold is
reached, the compact activates and converts the electoral college (i.e., a de jure indirect
election) into a de facto direct election; how non-member states allocate their electoral
votes is, largely, immaterial to determining the outcome (Koza et al., 2011; for an analysis
of NPVIC’s mechanical/legal weaknesses, see Bennett, 2010; Gaines, 2010; DeWitt and
Schwartz, 2016; for a rebuttal to the latter, see Koza, 2016). Finally, because NPVIC
utilizes state powers, it falls under the jurisdiction of each state legislature and governor
(city council and mayor, for the District of Columbia).
Whatever NPVIC’s merits, 10 states and DC have joined the compact (Table 2.1
and Figure 2.1, placing 165 electoral votes (or 61.1% of the requisite 270) under compact
control. In addition, state lawmakers in all 40 non-member states have introduced NPVIC
bills (to varying degrees of success short of public law status), a fact the present project
leverages to investigate the competing loyalties hypothesis.
2.3 A theory of geographic self-interest and elections
I treat the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact as a case of (attempted and on-
going) electoral rule choice, using the Benoit (2004) formal model of electoral system
change to guide the analysis. A story of “partisan self-interest,” Benoit’s model posi-
tions political parties as the key agents of reform and predicts that rule change occurs
if, and only if, two conditions are met. First, a party (or coalition of parties) possesses
the institutional muscle, or “fiat power,” to pass legislation (i.e., a share of legislative
seats greater than the decision rule, usually a simple majority). Second, that party (or
coalition) assesses an alternative electoral rule to be in its interest (i.e., it anticipates an
improved legislative seat share under the alternative relative to the status quo) and is
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thus “motivated” to exercise its fiat power on the issue.
As a utility-maximizing model based upon a “derived-preference theory of [office-
seeking] self-interest,” it provides the researcher with a “concise and falsifiable theory of
electoral system change,” complete with an “agenda” for empirical testing (Benoit, 2004,
p.366, 374, 377). It also supplements the qualitative approach of Renwick (2010), who
argues that empowered and self-interested elites tend to drive electoral reform over the
objections of other (soon-to-lose) elites, or what he terms reform by “elite-majority im-
position.” Renwick contrasts this route with “elite-mass interaction,” in which politicians
partially lose control of the process to, and must share decision-making with, the mass
public. Elite-mass interaction is unlikely to characterize the NPVIC case, as the public
remains largely unaware of the proposal and electoral college reform, while popular in
surveys, is not a salient issue: lawmakers simply are not run out for having failed to take
on the electoral college. As such, congruence (Downs, 1957; Pitkin, 1967) and reelection-
seeking (Mayhew, 1974) theories of representation, with their emphasis on responsiveness
to public opinion, do not appear to explain observable politician support.
2.3.1 Competing group loyalties in electoral reform
While a focus on parties is advisable, these theories miss a key point: they tend to
assume—for the sake of parsimony—that each party is, more or less, a unitary actor. As
such, this paradigm provides little, if any, room for intra-party variation in themotivation
to exercise the fiat power a given party possesses (Blais and Shugart, 2008; Blau, 2008;
Leyenaar and Hazan, 2011). As Tsebelis (1995, p.298) notes in his seminal study of
veto power, “What happens if players are collections of individuals without identical
positions?” Or, put another way, what if co-partisan actors—despite controlling the
various veto points—disagree on the desirability of the electoral reform? For instance,
a given party might control both chambers of a (co-equal) bicameral legislature, but
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whereas co-partisans in the lower chamber support the reform, their colleagues in the
upper chamber do not. Similarly, a given party might control all necessary veto points,
but only party leaders are interested in the change, whereas the rank-and-file legislators
support the status quo (Blais and Shugart, 2008; Blau, 2008). Or, as this paper will
explore, a given party might control necessary veto points in the legislative processes of
numerous subnational units, but only in a subset are co-partisans motivated to exercise
their fiat power on the issue. In other words, intra-party variation may be just as
important as inter-party differences in determining the fate of the alternative.
Why might a differential motivation within a given political party exist? As Blau
(2008) explains in his study of electoral reform in the United Kingdom, we must fo-
cus on from where politicians’ preferences on electoral rule choice originate (see also
Benoit, 2007; Bowler et al., 2006; Renwick, 2010; Shugart, 2008). He notes three possible
antecedents. First, “attitudes,” or the lawmaker’s position on whether the reform norma-
tively is good for her country. Second, “party interest,” or the utility-maximizing consid-
erations over whether the alternative will benefit her party. And, third, “self-interest,” or
the utility-maximizing considerations over whether the alternative will benefit her per-
sonally, and independent of her party. While it is perhaps tempting to equate non-party
self-interest with personal enrichment or career advancement, a promising source of self-
interest is that of additional group loyalties, in particular, allegiance to one’s geographic
(i.e., subnational) unit.
Geographic considerations are important because they can potentially affect self-
interest. Indeed, as Snyder (2001, p.94) argues, political processes tend to be “spatially
uneven” in their effects across a given country, introducing a degree of “within-nation vari-
ation” that produces important interactions between constituent pieces. Because elec-
toral rules distribute power (e.g., differential representation, voting weights, marginality,
etc.) among geographic units, activity that is advantageous for one unit (e.g., the reform
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of existing rules) might be disadvantageous for another. As such, and within a given
party, a geography-induced diversity, rather than a unanimity, of opinion might charac-
terize the electoral choice environment. As Snyder (2001) concludes, the disaggregation
of countries into their constituent, subnational parts not only affects our understanding
of the whole, but also the way in which we theorize about political phenomena, as well.
2.3.2 Application of competing loyalties to electoral college reform
The issue of electoral college reform provides fertile ground to look for evidence of con-
flicting loyalties, because it is not neutral in its operation: the status quo arrangement
advantages some states and disadvantages others, thus setting the stage for state versus
party identifications. As such, and within a party, lawmakers from disadvantaged states
are liable to view a reform alternative as desirable, whereas co-partisans from advantaged
states will view the alternative as anathema; or, put another way, partisan interest is held
constant while state-based self-interest varies. As noted earlier, although the electoral
college distorts state influence in manifold ways, in the analysis that follows I focus on
the two most discussed: first, the division of the country into safe and swing states; and,
second, into underrepresented and overrepresented states (Bennett, 2006; Dahl, 2003,
ch.4; Edwards, 2011; Longley and Braun, 1972).
First, the swing state distortion results as follows. Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the
Constitution reserves for each state the decision as to how to distribute its electors among
the candidates. Forty-eight of the 50 states and DC have opted for indivisible, winner-
take-all allocation of their electors to the candidate who wins a plurality of popular votes
in the state (i.e., unit rule); the runner-up, no matter how infinitesimal her margin of
loss, receives no electors. As such, presidential elections are won (or lost) depending
on a candidate’s performance in a handful of states that, fortuitously, happen to be
closely-divided. In such a state, the swing of a small fraction of popular votes from one
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candidate to the other could be sufficient to alter the allocation of 100% of the state’s
electoral votes! Candidates thus face a strong incentive to deploy their finite resources—
campaign dollars, advertisements, candidate and surrogate visits, and other get-out-
the-vote activities—in battlegrounds (see Shaw, 1999, 2008). Critically, this attention
translates into investments in the state, whether into local businesses, into state and
local party building, or into the courtship of local political players.
Additionally, there are signs that the winning candidate, upon becoming president,
uses his office to shower swing states with particularistic benefits, or what has become
known as the “permanent campaign.” Doherty (2007, 2010) and Charnock et al. (2009),
for example, each find evidence that the travel schedules of sitting presidents dispropor-
tionately favor swing states, especially the most populous ones. Similarly, swing state
favoritism extends to the selective application of presidential unilateral power. Reeves
(2011) demonstrates that presidents provide swing states with disaster declarations more
often than safe states; similarly, Hudak (2014) and Kriner and Reeves (2015) find evi-
dence that presidents disproportionately direct to swing states federal funds in the form
of discretionary grants (but see Larcinese et al., 2006). In the face of such evidence,
the received wisdom that the president serves a national constituency may indeed be
untrue; like members of Congress, he appears to engage in particularistic targeting (for
an encompassing recent treatment, see Kriner and Reeves, 2015).
The small state distortion presents a second source of non-party, state-based self-
interest, because the electoral college reproduces the Senate’s (intentional) overrepre-
sentation of less populous states. This distortion results as follows. Article II, Section
1, Clause 2 of the Constitution awards to each state a number of electors to the elec-
toral college equal in size to its congressional delegation, the latter of which is inherently
malapportioned due to Article I, Section 3, Clause 1’s requirement that each state re-
ceive equal representation in the Senate, irrespective of its population. Unlike the swing
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state distortion, which is grounded in the logic of campaign resource allocation and eco-
nomic benefits, the small state distortion is about inflated institutional power: malap-
portionment grants a small state elector far more weight than she would have under
a population-based apportionment scheme (Edwards, 2011; Haider-Markel et al., 2002;
Korzi, 2010). And, once a political minority has achieved disproportional institutional
power, it typically is disinclined to support an attempt at correction (Haider-Markel
et al., 2002).
The situation is further complicated by the fact that, in America, the received wisdom
is that the founders purposefully designed the Senate—and thus the electoral college—
with two functionalist objectives in mind: first, to protect small state interests against
the tyranny of large state majorities; and, second, to enshrine the co-equal “sovereignty”
of the states as members in a federal system. Although Lee and Oppenheimer (1999,
ch.2) argue convincingly that the functionalist interpretation of the Senate’s founding is
“both flawed and ahistorical,” the point is, more or less, academic: because small state
lawmakers believe their states possess unique interests that the founders sought to protect
and guarantee, it is true in practice—if not in fact. As Lee and Oppenheimer (1999, p.43)
concede, “Equal state apportionment persists not because it serves any current function,
but as a path-dependent consequence of [an] initial agreement more than two hundred
years ago.” If small states received at the nation’s founding more power than they
perhaps deserved, they have no reason to forfeit it now—whether in the Senate, the
electoral college, or elsewhere.
Taken together, the swing and small state distortions provide two compelling compet-
ing loyalties capable of attenuating the canonical relationship between partisan interest
and electoral rule choice. Before proceeding, however, the application of institutionalist
models to the specific case of NPVIC requires a minor tweak to the traditional (and
admittedly narrow) conceptualization of partisan interest. With electoral college reform,
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state lawmakers are not selecting the rules under which they will be elected, but rather
the rules under which the president will be selected. In other words, the relationship
between electoral rule choice and the office-seeking interests of the (legislative) party is
admittedly less direct. As a solution, I broaden the definition to include the election of all
co-partisans, including the presidential candidate of the reform-pursuant party. Indeed,
an expanded conceptualization of partisan interest perhaps better approximates the real
world. As single-minded seekers of reelection (Mayhew, 1974), state lawmakers, too,
should benefit—either electorally or personally—from rules that increase their party’s
odds of capturing the White House.7
2.3.3 Hypotheses
Based upon the above discussion, I develop and test the following three hypotheses about
the relationship between partisan control of the legislative process and NPVIC progress.
H1 tests the canonical partisan hypothesis, whereas H2 assesses the competing loyalties
hypothesis:
◦ H1: An increase in the level of Democratic control of the legislative process is
associated with greater NPVIC progress. (+)
◦ H2.a(b): The relationship between Democratic control and NPVIC progress will
depend upon the state-level factor of marginality (overrepresentation). The condi-
7 With many state elections being low information affairs, voters tend to rely on heuristics, such as
party ID or presidential candidate approval, when deciding how to vote on down-ballot races (Schaffner
and Streb, 2002), a phenomenon that generates the so-called “presidential coattail effect” (Campbell,
1986). Relatedly, Rogers (2016) finds that state legislative elections follow the vicissitudes of national
politics, since voters treat the former as a “second-order election.” Office-seeking aside, legislators
motivated by policy concerns will prefer a president closer to their ideal point (Downs, 1957), while
legislators concerned with promotion will view a co-partisan president as a means to a presidentially-
appointed position (Lewis, 2010, ch.2).
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tional marginal effect, then, will attenuate as we move along the continuum from
safe (underrepresented) to swing (overrepresented) states. (−)
The analysis is thus at the aggregate level, with each state-year serving as an observation.
2.4 Data and operationalizations
To test the aforementioned hypotheses, I construct a dataset that combines relevant
political and institutional data with information on NPVIC’s advancement through the
states. The four focal variables are: first, NPVIC progress through the legislative pro-
cess (npvicprog); second, partisan control of the legislative process (demcontrol); and
finally, two state-level electoral college advantages, marginality (statemargin) and over-
representation (stateoverrep). The data cover the period 2006–14. (Illinois introduced
the country’s first NPVIC bill, Senate Bill 2724, on January 20, 2006.)
2.4.1 Dependent variable
In order to obtain data on the compact, I collected summarized bill histories for every
NPVIC bill introduced from 2006–14, using keyword searches (“NPV,” “NPVIC,” “Na-
tional Popular Vote,” and “electoral college”) of state legislature websites.8 Overall, I
have recovered 267 NPVIC bills across the 50 states and DC, which reduces to 262 when
the District of Columbia and Nebraska are excluded for unicameralism (see next sub-
section). Finally, I have combined into a single bill cluster (or legislative effort) all bills
introduced for state i in year j, taking the progress of the furthest advancing bill as the
8 Two existing NPVIC sources, the records of the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)
and the NPVIC advocacy non-profit, National Popular Vote, Inc., respectively, were found to be in-
complete. Because each source misses a large number of bills, I opted for a comprehensive approach
based upon keyword searches of state legislature websites, reserving the NCSL and NPV, Inc. records
to cross-check my own data collection.
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Originating chamber Receiving chamber Governor Code Cases (%)
Not introduced . . 0 231 (58.2%)
Introduced; fails committee . . 1 100 (25.2%)
Passes committee; fails chamber . . 2 27 (6.8%)
Passes committee & chamber Fails committee . 3 16 (4.0%)
Passes committee & chamber Passes committee; fails chamber . 4 7 (1.8%)
Passes committee & chamber Passes committee & chamber Veto 5 6 (1.5%)
Passes committee & chamber Passes committee & chamber Sign 6 10 (2.5%)
Table 2.2: Ordinal operationalization of NPVIC progress
representative of the group. Such an approach is necessary because, within a cluster,
the individual progress of a given bill is unlikely to be independent of the others: the
legislature need only move on one NPVIC bill at a time. Thus, treating duplicate bills as
separate data points would result in a subset of bills receiving (artificially) low progress
scores for reasons unrelated to legislator support.9 The result is 166 unique legislative
efforts, or 41.8% of total observations.10
Next, I code each NPVIC bill cluster (henceforth, bill) on how far in the legislative
process it advanced; the ordinal scale ranges from “0” (i.e., no bill introduced) to “6” (i.e.,
9 For example, consider a pair of companion bills, one introduced in the House and the other in the
Senate. If the Senate committee sits on its bill out of deference to the House, then the progress of the
Senate bill clearly depends upon the progress of its House companion. Similarly, a House committee
faced with three duplicate House bills is unlikely to act on all three. Rather, it proceeds with one and
neglects the other two. Relatedly, in many states, the summarized bill histories do not state explicitly
whether a given same-session bill is part of a companion arrangement, is a competitor to another bill,
or even is a replacement for an earlier, stalled effort still in the process of dying.
10 With 49 states over nine years, there are 441 potential state-year pairings. Once a state joins the
compact, however, it cannot introduce NPVIC legislation in subsequent years. These 44 observations
therefore are coded as missing, to indicate that no NPVIC introduction was possible. Of the remaining
397 observations, 231 are coded as “0” to indicate no NPVIC bill given that introduction was possible,
leaving 166 legislative efforts.
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public law status), as seen in Table 2.2. In general, the scale focuses on whether a bill
passes out of the originating chamber committee system, receives and wins its originating
chamber floor vote, passes out of the receiving chamber committee system, receives and
wins its receiving chamber floor vote, and is signed into law by the state executive (or
becomes law over her veto). The more steps the NPVIC legislative effort clears in a
given state-year, the higher-valued its coding. In constructing the scale, I have been
guided by the concern that each value be accessible to each state-year observation. (For
information on the simplifying assumptions I used to standardize the legislative process
across 51 subnational units, see the Appendix.)
2.4.2 Independent variable
For the partisan control variable, I obtained for each state-year observation the share of
House seats and Senate seats for each major party, as well as information on the partisan
control of each state’s governorship.11 From this data, I develop an 8-point ordinal scale
of the degree to which the legislative process for a given observation is under Democratic
control, which ranges from “0” (i.e., complete Republican control) to “8” (i.e., complete
Democratic control). The measure is a composite of two quantities: first, the number
of steps in the legislative process Democrats control, of which there are three: the lower
chamber (House or Assembly), the upper chamber (Senate), and the governorship; and,
second, the size of the Democratic majority in a given chamber, a continuous variable I
divide into three bins: strong (x ≥ .55), weak (.50 < x < .55), or none (x ≤ .50).
The use of these criteria produces an initial 16 unique combinations. To obtain the
8-point scale, however, I make a number of assumptions, which improves the parsimony
of the variable without harming its validity. First, I treat the chambers of a bicameral
11 Data source for legislative and executive control: Council of State Governments (CSG) for 2006–08;
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) for 2009–14.
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Steps controlled Legislature Governor Code Cases (%)
0 Neither chamber . 0 193 (48.6%)
1 One chamber weakly . 1 32 (8.1%)
1 One chamber strongly . 2 33 (8.3%)
2 Both chambers weakly No 3 1 (.3%)
2 Both chambers, one weakly and one strongly No 4 14 (3.5%)
2 Both chambers strongly No 5 37 (9.3%)
3 Both chambers weakly Yes 6 3 (.8%)
3 Both chambers, one weakly and one strongly Yes 7 21 (5.3%)
3 Both chambers strongly Yes 8 63 (15.9%)
Notes: Control of governorship immaterial for rows 1 to 3, per assumptions noted in text.
Table 2.3: Ordinal operationalization of partisan control
legislature as interchangeable, because either may act as the originator of NPVIC leg-
islation and there would seem to be no obvious advantage to beginning the process in
one chamber as opposed to the other. Second, the only role provided for the governor
is that of signer or vetoer; all other roles (e.g., lobbyist, agenda-setter, public advocate,
etc.) are placed aside. As such, Democratic control of the governorship is immaterial
when the party does not control both chambers, because presumably Republican control
of at least one chamber would prevent the bill from reaching the governor. A final set of
assumptions supplies the ordinality of the scale. I assume that it is better for Democrats
to control: first, a given chamber strongly; second, the legislature to the governorship
(since the governor is relevant only at the end of the process); and, third, as many steps
as possible (but see point 2).12
12 A few minor issues of possible measurement error are worth mentioning. First, in cases of a 50–50%
split of a chamber between Democrats and Republicans, I award a code of “None” (0) as a precaution,
although tie-breaking procedures could end up giving Democrats a weak majority. Such instances,
however, are exceedingly uncommon. Second, seats vacant at the time of data collection are in essence
missing values. Third, chamber partisan compositions, as well as the governor’s party identification,
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2.4.3 Moderating variables
For each state-level moderator, I opt for an operationalization that produces a continuous
variable.13 First, I calculate the marginality of each state i for each year j using the two-
party presidential vote from the election prior or equal to the state-year observation.
As seen in Equation 2.1, I have transformed the variable so that higher values denote
increased marginality and, thus, greater status quo advantage. The most (least) marginal
state possible is 1 (0).
statemarginij = 1− |demshareij − repshareij| (2.1)
Stated in terms of H2, as statemargin increases we should expect to see the hypothesized
positive relationship between Democratic control and NPVIC progress attenuate.
Second, I calculate the overrepresentation of state i for each year j using the ratio
between each observation’s share of electoral college electors and of the national pop-
ulation (excluding all U.S. territories but including D.C.). As seen in Equation 2.2, a
1:1 ratio represents perfect parity between a given observation’s elector and population
shares; values greater than one indicate overrepresentation, whereas values less than one
indicate underrepresentation.
stateoverrepij =
electorshareij
popshareij
(2.2)
are taken at the beginning of a legislative session. This could be a problem if the composition of the
legislature or the party of the governor changes between the time a bill was introduced and the later
stages in its life. However, the use of partisan data at the start of a legislative session is, to my knowledge,
standard within the state legislative studies subfield.
13 Data source for marginality: U.S. National Archives, presidential election results 2004–12. Data
source for overrepresentation: U.S. Census Bureau, population estimates 2006–2014, as well as the U.S.
National Archives, number of electors per state 2004–12.
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Stated in terms of H2, as stateoverrep increases we should expect to see the hypothesized
positive relationship between Democratic control and NPVIC progress attenuate.
Variable Type Obs. (n) Mean Median s.d. Min. Max.
NPVIC progress Ordinal 397 .806 0 1.34 0 6
Democratic control (unweighted) Ordinal 397 1.08 1 1.2 0 3
Democratic control (weighted) Ordinal 397 2.55 1 3.14 0 8
State marginality Continuous 397 .845 .859 .104 .507 .999
State overrepresentation Continuous 397 1.31 1.08 .534 .776 3.18
Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics for key variables
2.5 Analysis
To test the above mentioned hypotheses, I estimate three Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
models; OLS has the benefit of being the most easily understood regression method,
due both to its ubiquity and the imposed linear nature of its effects. However, an
ordinal dependent variable may violate OLS’s assumption that the intervals between its
categories are equivalent (i.e., that movement from one point on the ordered scale to the
next entails constant difficulty; for more, see Long, 1997). As such, I also run a series
of ordered probit models as a robustness check. The results of this specification support
those of the OLS, and thus are reserved for the online Appendix. Turning back to the
OLS specification, all models use standard errors clustered on the state.14
2.5.1 Results
The first model is a simple bivariate baseline, whereas the second includes covariates
for marginality and overrepresentation. Together, these linear additive models test the
14 Clustering the standard errors on the year, rather than on the state, does not affect the results.
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canonical partisan hypothesis (H1) of the electoral reform literature. The result of the
baseline linear-additive model in Table 2.5 provides early support for the canonical par-
tisan hypothesis: a one-unit increase in Democratic control is associated with a .181
increase in NPVIC progress. In short, and to return to the language of Benoit (2004),
partisan (i.e., Democratic) fiat power appears to drive NPVIC’s state-by-state advance-
ment. This finding is robust to the inclusion, in Model 2, of the marginality and over-
representation covariates. Although each of the two state characteristics is properly
signed as negative (i.e., as a state becomes more advantaged by the status quo, NPVIC
legislation falters), only marginality rises to traditional levels of statistical significance.
Ultimately, however, I am interested not merely in the presence of partisan fiat power
but also in the differential motivation to exercise it—that is, its intra-party conditional-
ity. As noted earlier, marginality and overrepresentation should provide the self-interest
incentives necessary to override the relationship between Democratic control of the leg-
islative process and NPVIC progress: Democrats in status quo-advantaged states have
a stake in the maintenance of the existing institutional order that their co-partisans in
disadvantaged states lack (i.e., the competing loyalties hypothesis). The proper model
to test a conditional hypothesis is a multiplicative specification (Brambor et al., 2006;
Franzese and Kam, 2009). As such the third model employs two interaction terms, be-
tween Democratic control and each of the two moderators, respectively. The conditional
marginal effect of demcontrol on npvicprog, then, is calculated as follows:
∂npvicprog
∂demcontrol
= β1 + β3
(
statemarginality
)
+ β5
(
stateoverrep
)
(2.3)
∂npvicprog
∂demcontrol
= β1 + β3
(
statemarginality
)
+ β5
(
stateoverrep
)
(2.4)
Where β1 is the direct effect of Democratic control on NPVIC progress and β3 and β5 are
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the coefficients on the marginality and overrepresentation interaction terms, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
NPVIC progress NPVIC progress NPVIC progress
Democratic control (w) 0.181*** 0.178*** 1.041***
(0.030) (0.028) (0.233)
State marginality -2.661*** -0.854*
(0.857) (0.426)
Democratic control x marginality -0.969***
(0.246)
State overrepresentation -0.223 -0.153***
(0.137) (0.055)
Democratic control x overrepresentation -0.0351
(0.058)
Constant 0.346*** 2.894*** 1.270***
(0.048) (0.808) (0.406)
N 397 397 397
R2 0.178 0.214 0.255
Robust standard errors in parentheses; all models OLS
∗p < .10, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01
Table 2.5: Marginal effect of Democratic control on NPVIC progress
Model 3 in Table 2.5 reports the coefficients for β1, β3, and β5. There, the 1.041 coef-
ficient on Democratic control is meaningless, because in reality, no election will result in
a state marginality score of 0 (i.e., perfectly safe). As such, with an interaction model,
we are “not directly interested” in the significance and magnitude of the “model parame-
ters per se,” and must therefore “go beyond the traditional results” of a regression table
(Brambor et al., 2006, p.74). The standard errors are also meaningless, because those
reported in the standard regression table refer to a situation in which the moderating
variable is held at 0. This is an important point. As Brambor et al. (2006, p.74) note, “It
is perfectly possible for the marginal effect of X on Y to be significant for substantively
relevant values of the modifying variable. . . even if the coefficient on the interaction term
[in the regression table] is insignificant.”
Figure 2.2 (Figure 2.3) graphically represents the extent to which marginality (over-
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Figure 2.2: Marginal effect conditional on marginality
representation) moderates the relationship between Democratic control and NPVIC progress,
with overrepresentation (marginality) held at its mean. Plotted along the x -axis is the
focal moderator, with movement from left to right indicating greater electoral college ad-
vantage; the y-axis displays the marginal effect of Democratic control on NPVIC progress,
such that a downward slope to the line indicates a marginal effect that decreases as the
moderator increases in value. Turning first to the moderating effect of marginality (Fig-
ure 2.2), we find strong, statistically significant support for H2.a: as states become more
marginal, the effect of Democratic control on NPVIC progress attenuates, more or less,
to zero. Thus, in the world of safe and swing states, partisan fiat power is but a partial
explanation for NPVIC progress: the swing state distortion presents lawmakers with
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Figure 2.3: Marginal effect conditional on overrepresentation
a salient competing loyalty and thus generates intra-party variation in the motivation
to exercise partisan fiat power. With respect to overrepresentation (Figure 2.3), there
is little evidence in support of H2.b. True, as states become more overrepresented the
effect of Democratic control on NPVIC progress attenuates, but the magnitude is ap-
preciably small and, moreover, the result does not meet traditional levels of statistical
significance. Thus, here partisan interest is perhaps a sufficient explanation, as the small
state distortion does not generate intra-party variation.
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2.5.2 Discussion
Stuck at 165 of the 270 electoral votes necessary for activation, the question for the
compact is from where the remaining 105 electoral votes can come. The results of the
foregoing analysis of NPVIC’s 2006–14 march through the states indicate that, if the past
is indeed prologue, NPVIC’s pending search for new members should be most fruitful
in Democratic-controlled states the electoral college status quo disadvantages. Indeed,
swing status is such a strong moderator that at the far end of the spectrum the effect of
partisan control on NPVIC progress disappears almost entirely.
That said, the theme of 2016 has been that past trends may not continue into the
future. With respect to NPVIC, the results of the 2016 election could lead to a shift,
2017 and beyond, in the type of support the compact receives from Democrats: that is,
a conversion to the canonical partisan hypothesis, with newfound unity in place of pre-
vious, conditional support. There are a few reasons this could come to pass. First, with
the party’s old 2000 wounds reopened and the partisan identity of swing state Democrats
newly primed, the pull of competing state loyalties could weaken. Additionally, the elec-
toral college will likely continue to disadvantage Democratic presidential candidates, due
to the geographic distribution of the party’s voters (i.e., concentration in metropolitan
areas and on the coasts). As a result, swing state Democrats, if and when they gain con-
trol of their respective legislative processes, might conclude their party’s interests—and
perhaps their own progressive ambitions, as well—are best served by an alternative to
the status quo.15
15 John Frank, “Colorado Democratic Lawmakers Push Effort to Elect the President by National
Popular Vote,” The Denver Post, 15 Feb. 2017, http://www.denverpost.com/2017/02/15/colorado-
presidential-election-national-popular-vote/; Susan Haigh, “More States Consider Working around the
Electoral College,” Associated Press, 23 Dec. 2016, http://www.yahoo.com/news/more-states-consider-
working-around-electoral-college-183558370.html.
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For now, however, the competing loyalties hypothesis adequately captures the NPVIC
landscape. Nevertheless, work remains to be done with respect to the direction of the
canonical partisan effect. While my statistical analysis—like a few earlier accounts based
upon descriptive data (e.g., Gaines, 2010; Silver, 2014)—has further illuminated the
extent to which NPVIC is tied to Democrats, we still lack a good understanding as
to why this party, as opposed to the Republicans, is supportive of the compact. In
other words, what motivates Democratic lawmakers to exercise their fiat power on this
issue? Perhaps two plurality reversals have primed Democrats to view the electoral
college as an institution that mechanically works against their partisan interests;16 or,
alternatively, perhaps the party, ideologically-speaking, views reform as a means to a
more normatively palatable system—one that would be easier to use, to understand, and
to accept as legitimate. Looking comparatively, Bowler et al. (2006), for example, have
found that politicians on the left are more likely than those on the right to favor electoral
reform. Absent corroboration from systematic elite interviews, however, any explanation
is mere conjecture.
2.6 Conclusion
When Sen. Mitch McConnell (R–KY) spoke to the Heritage Foundation in December
2011 about the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC), he sang the kind of
partisan, zero-sum tune that scholars of electoral reform have come to expect: because
16 An interesting thought exercise is to consider how support for NPVIC might change if a wrong
winner lightening bolt were to strike Republicans rather than Democrats. Would it lead to bipartisan
support for NPVIC? Or, perhaps, would the positions of the parties shift, with Democrats in opposition
and Republicans in favor? This is more than an academic point: in 2012, it was for a time possible
that Barack Obama could win the electoral college while losing the popular vote to his Republican
challenger (Silver, 2014). Indeed, a key shortcoming of NPVIC is that, as a statutory measure, it could
be vulnerable to such electoral vagaries (Gaines, 2010).
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electoral rules affect who wins and who loses, the issue of electoral rule choice tends to
place parties in opposition to each other. True, parties (in pursuit of advantage) are the
engines that power institutional change, but the canonical partisan hypothesis—with its
focus on inter - rather than intra-party conflict—risks missing, in the name of parsimony,
the potential nuances of the reform process. Indeed, Leyenaar and Hazan (2011, p.443)
and Blais and Shugart (2008) have each argued that one of the next lines of inquiry
for the subfield is to explore the extent to which parties should be conceptualized (and
operationalized) as non-unitary actors. The balance is thus a modification to existing
theory that directs scholars to ask not only which party favors/opposes the reform,
but also whether, within a given party, there is a unanimity or diversity of opinion.
This question is admittedly secondary to the former, but it is often just as central to
comprehending the dynamics of reform.
The present study joins this enterprise by highlighting the extent to which alternative,
geographic-based interests might conflict with party-based interests and thus lead to
intra-party defections on the issue of electoral college reform (i.e., the competing loyalties
hypothesis). Using an original dataset on NPVIC’s progress through the U.S. state
legislatures, my analysis indicates that (to capture accurately the on-the-ground reality
of NPVIC) McConnell’s speech required a qualifier: while the bill tends to progress the
furthest in the legislative process when Democrats are in control, the party’s support
for the compact is actually conditional on geographic-based considerations, such as a
state’s swing status; the result on small state overrepresentation is null. In other words,
context matters: in some states, the partisan and geographic interests of Democrats
align, whereas in others, they misalign. The party is thus not a monolith, and as such,
partisanship alone provides an incomplete picture.
As with all case studies, NPVIC involves country-specific details that, at a minimum,
encourage caution in a discussion of the finding’s generalizability—after all, the elec-
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toral college is a peculiar institution.17 That said, the competing loyalties hypothesis
has broad applications, both in terms of other geographic units in the U.S., other coun-
tries, other electoral institutions, and even other policy domains. For instance, federal
systems, in their layering of the levels of government (and thus of party organizations),
offer fertile ground for partisan versus geographic conflicts, such as over congressional
redistricting or the movement from constituency-based single-member plurality to list
proportional representation. Yet another avenue for conflicting loyalties is partisan ver-
sus ethnic/tribal or gender identities, such as over the use of majority-minority districts,
special ethnic voter rolls (e.g., the Maori electorates in New Zealand), or gender quotas.
Beyond electoral rules, many issues—energy policy, social policy, etc.—often force law-
makers to balance partisan and geographic loyalties. Future research might take up such
additional cases, improve upon the present project by locating individual-level data, or
by employing a cross-national design (perhaps one that uses variation in the maturity
of a country’s party system or its degree of party discipline to see if the relationship is
further moderated). By studying NPVIC and other cases like it around the world, we
can improve our understanding of the process of electoral reform and can continue to
refine our theories of the conditions under which it occurs.
17 While Blais and Shugart (2008, p.184) believe in the pursuit of generalizable patterns with respect
to electoral reform, it is perhaps worth repeating their ever-eloquent disclaimer: “. . . the path of electoral
reform. . . is a complicated one, that. . . varies immensely across countries and over time. . . A detailed
understanding of the various cases ought to make us wary about bold assertions about necessary and/or
sufficient conditions.”
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Chapter 3
The effect of core values on support for electoral reform:
Evidence from two survey experiments
3.1 Introduction to the chapter
At a minimum, democratic government is electoral government: the governed mass public
must possess the means to regularly select and sanction its governors (Dahl, 1989; Powell,
2000; Schumpeter, 1942, ch.11–12).1 But if elections are the foundation of democracy,
then the rules that structure the electoral game are its bricks and mortar: by stipulat-
ing how an election is to run (Massicotte et al., 2004), they constrain the behavior of
parties and candidates, voters and officials. More importantly, certain rules are liable to
advantage some political actors and to disadvantage others, as well as to affect who wins
and loses the election. Rae (1967) candidly assesses the importance of electoral rules
as follows: “Electoral laws are of special importance for every group and individual in a
society, because they help to decide who writes the other laws”—i.e., the actual policy
outputs about which citizens care. No wonder, then, that the way we vote fascinates
astute participants and spectators, alike.
A central tenet in the electoral systems subfield is that, because the rules can affect
who wins, parties and their members pursue opportunities to advance partisan objectives
via the strategic adoption and adaptation of electoral rules (Benoit, 2004, 2007; Boix,
1999; Renwick, 2010; Colomer, 2005; Leyenaar and Hazan, 2011; Cain, 2014). In other
words, when given the choice between a rule that helps and a rule that hurts her party,
1 I would like to thank committee members Larry Bartels, Josh Clinton, Dave Lewis, Zeynep Somer-
Topcu, and Liz Zechmeister. Additional thanks is due to colleagues Dan Alexander, Allison Anoll,
Maggie Deichert, Drew Engelhardt, Cindy Kam, James Martherus, Michael Shepherd, and members of
Vanderbilt’s CSDI Working Group for their helpful comments. Support for this project was provided
by the Department of Political Science and Vanderbilt University. Last presented at SPSA 2019.
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a partisan (acting rationally) should pick the former—defending it from attack if it is
the status quo; or, leading the charge for reform if it is the alternative. This scholarly
consensus exists for good reason: not only is partisan identification a stable and vis-
ceral, group-based predisposition (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960; Green et al., 2004; Bartels,
2002), but also electoral rules affect parties more than any other group: their slates and
candidates run as ‘partisan teams’ under such rules and, once in office, their elected and
appointed members populate the deliberative bodies and administrative positions tasked
with making and updating the rules that govern the conduct of elections. Additionally,
survey and experimental evidence indicate that both elites (Bowler et al., 2006) and the
mass public (Biggers, 2018; Alvarez et al., 2011; Wilson and Brewer, 2013) reason about
electoral institutions in partisan terms, actively searching for (or at least passively open
to) opportunities for gain. As such, scholars return again and again to “goal-seeking”
parties as the “conscious and purposive” engines that power institutional change (Benoit,
2007, 370–72).
Having anointed partisan self-interest the key determinant of electoral rule choice,
the extant literature largely has dismissed other potential motivations (cf. Renwick, 2010;
Bowler and Donovan, 2013). But if a neglected determinant, too, has an appreciable effect
on actors’ decision-making on the reform issue, then a narrow focus on partisan concerns
is inappropriate, as it is incomplete. In this paper, I put to the empirical test one such
neglected political predisposition: core values, defined as a set of normative-based, ab-
stract beliefs “about desirable modes of conduct or desirable end-states of existence” that
guide citizens in their evaluations of policy and people (Rokeach, 1973; McClosky and
Zaller, 1984; Feldman, 1988; Schwartz, 1994; McCann, 1997; Goren, 2001, 2005; Alvarez
and Brehm, 2002). Put another way, core values—of which egalitarianism, tolerance,
self-reliance, and individualism are prominent examples—constitute one’s understanding
of ‘right and wrong’ and, as such, of how a ‘good person’ ought to behave and of how a
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‘good society’ ought to operate. In theory core values should be germane to the issue of
electoral rule choice because they engage notions of fairness, representativeness, equal-
ity, self-worth, order and security, etc.—that is the very building blocks of how an ideal
election ought to be structured, the individuals it ought to include, and the collective
outcomes it ought to produce.
Do individuals deploy their core values when taking a decision on electoral reform?
If so, in what way do their values interact with their partisan goals on the same issue?
If, for example, a political actor is confronted with a reform predicted to advance her
conception of the common good but to harm her party, what does she do: does she
sacrifice the value for the partisan gain, sacrifice the partisan gain for the value, or
become paralyzed by indecision?
To answer these questions, I utilize a factorial experimental design that manipulates
the partisan- and values-implications of a fictitious reform proposal on absentee voting;
this design allows me to control the number of factors to which a respondent is exposed:
1) partisan self-interest only; 2) the focal value only; or, 3) various combinations of the
two. Across two different samples, I find strong and consistent evidence of a role—net of
partisan concerns—for core values. Furthermore, for situations in which the focal value
and partisan self-interest have been made to pull in opposite directions, I find that the
former can dramatically attenuate the effect of the latter—i.e., in the data, individuals
express support for rule changes that disadvantage their preferred party, provided their
core value is advanced. As such, I demonstrate that the relationship between partisan
self-interest and electoral reform is indeed more nuanced than the received wisdom has
let on: other motivations shape the process, too.
Although the issue on which I focus is electoral reform, my findings have broad impli-
cations for position-taking across issue domains, and join existing work—by Goren and
his coauthors especially (Goren, 2001, 2005; Goren et al., 2009)—in exploring (and fill-
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ing out) the complex, fascinating relationship between these two bedrock predispositions.
Relative to existing observational work on the interaction between partisanship and core
values, this paper’s factorial design provides for a notable gain in causal identification,
in two ways. First, although we cannot randomly assign a partisan identity or a value
position to an individual, we can nonetheless randomly prime which of these two predis-
positions is at the top of her mind; the factorial design thus gives us greater confidence
that, when answering a question on her support for a given reform proposal, we know
about what the focal respondent is thinking. Second, and unlike in observational studies,
the factorial design allows the researcher to pull the levers of partisan self-interest and
core values against each other and, due to the nature of the electoral reform issue, in a
way that is quite believable. Indeed, this paper is the first to pit core values and partisan
self-interest head-to-head in countervailing situations.
An additional contribution is that, as Leyenaar and Hazan (2011, 440–43) convinc-
ingly have argued, one of the next lines of inquiry for the electoral reform subfield is to
seek a “synthesis of determinants” for reform, by theorizing about and testing motivations
other than the “dominant” partisan self-interest approach. The present study joins this
enterprise as the first to apply the insights of the core values literature to the issue of
electoral rule choice, and in doing so, highlights the extent to which one such alternative,
predispositional core values, must be a part of our explanations for electoral reform. In
Section 3.2, I outline theory and introduce hypotheses. In Section 3.3, I elaborate on the
experimental design, including my data sources, coding scheme, and empirical strategy.
Section 3.4 presents results, and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 A theory of core values and elections
The potential of electoral rules to affect—mechanically and psychologically—who wins
and loses (e.g., Duverger, 1959; Rae, 1967; Blais and Carty, 1991; Lijphart, 1994; Cox,
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1997) makes them a prime target for political actors in search of an advantage. Although
previous studies have identified a range of potential electoral reformers, from colonial
powers to international organizations to academics and experts (see Benoit, 2007, for a
review), typically scholars of electoral reform focus on the role of political parties. More
than any other group, parties are well-invested (i.e., their members run for office under
these rules) and well-positioned (i.e., they control the legislative and administrative offices
in charge of making and enforcing the rules) to act as reformers (Boix, 1999; Colomer,
2005; Benoit and Schiemann, 2001; Pilet, 2007; but see Andrews and Jackman, 2005;
Shvetsova, 2003; Sakamoto, 1999, on the way in which imperfect information makes
parties uncertain, and thus at times reluctant, reformers). The quintessence of this
approach is the Benoit (2004) model, which positions parties as the key agents of reform
and predicts rule change will occur if and only if: first, a party possesses the “fiat power”
(e.g., a majority of seats in the assembly) necessary to pass the legislation; and second,
the same party is “motivated” to pursue an alternative to the status quo rule, believing the
former will improve its subsequent electoral performance. Supplementing this approach,
survey-based studies have found that party elites (Bowler et al., 2006) and partisans in
the mass public (Biggers, 2018; Alvarez et al., 2011; Wilson and Brewer, 2013) indeed
think about electoral rules in such group-based terms.
3.2.1 Core values and position-taking
The dominance of the partisan-self interest approach, however, has masked a key prob-
lem: the extant literature largely has neglected to examine other potential determinants
of electoral reform, as well as to investigate the way in which such motivations may
interact with partisan-self interest on the issue. True, the reform literature occasion-
ally concedes that “values,” however vaguely defined, may play a role in the process of
reform—for example, an actor may not pursue a partisan objective but rather a societal
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good, such as a “social concern [for] fairness or representation, a concern with producing
good government, safeguards against hyperconcentration of power, and so on” (Benoit,
2007, p.380–81; see also Renwick, 2010, ch.2, p.37–46). As Renwick notes, many scholars
dismiss values as being of little consequence to rule choice relative to partisan concerns
(cf. Blais and Massicotte, 1997; Katz, 2005):
For some authors, it seems that these [partisan self-interest] are the only
considerations that matter. Riker (1984, p.103) contends that ‘most actual
choices [of electoral systems] have been made with the intention of promoting
partisan advantage rather than with the goal of incorporating sound constitu-
tional principles into governmental structure.’ Kellner (1995, p.23) observes
aphoristically that, ‘In politics, when principle collides with self-interest, prin-
ciple tends to retreat with a bloody nose.’ (Renwick, 2010, p.37)
Benoit (2007, p.380–82), similarly, concedes that extra-partisan concerns, such as ensur-
ing fair outcomes, ease of use, enhanced efficacy, etc., “tend to figure more in the rhetoric
of electoral reform than in actual decision making.” That is, an actor’s invocation of val-
ues is likely to be “strategic [rather than]. . . genuine,” a way to appeal to the mass public
in light of the fact that overt appeals to partisan self-interest tend not to fare particu-
larly well (Bowler and Donovan, 2013, p.54–55). Where the extant literature does credit
values, however, is during times of crisis. More than most, Renwick (2010, p.50) has
attended to the relationship between values and electoral reform, but in his story, values
primarily matter to rule choice when systemic, institutional failure “seriously threatens”
the polity and its way of life. In this exceptional circumstance, elites and the public
rally around reform as a means to re-secure the values that undergird their society (see
also Sakamoto, 1999; Shugart, 2001). The implication is that during periods of ‘normal
politics,’ partisans will resume their search for advantage, pushing values aside.2
2 An important exception is Bowler and Donovan (2013, ch.2–3), who surveyed U.K. voters during
the 2011 Alternative Vote referendum. They find that views on procedural fairness, majoritarianism,
and voter influence over officials indeed affected citizen position-taking on the reform: “The attitudes
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Battery Item
Egalitarian-
ism
1. Our society should make sure that everyone has an equal chance to
get ahead in life.
2. Our country would be better off if people were truly treated equally.
3. Our society should do what is necessary to make sure that everyone
has an equal opportunity to succeed.
Moral
tolerance
1. The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral
behavior to those changes.
2. We should be tolerant of people who choose to live according to their
own moral standards, even if they are different from our own.
3. Our society does not need to be accepting of individuals whose values
or behaviors are different from most. (rev.)
Self-reliance
1. In order to get ahead in life, individuals should depend on themselves
rather than on others.
2. Our country is best off when we emphasize reliance on others, rather
than self-reliance. (rev.)
3. Our society would benefit greatly if people were truly self-sufficient.
Economic
individualism
1. Most people who don’t get ahead should not blame the system—they
have only themselves to blame.
2. Any person who is willing to work hard has a good chance of
succeeding.
3. Even if people try hard, they often cannot reach their goals. (rev.)
Note: Each battery utilized the following prompt: ‘Now, we will show several statements that people
sometimes make. For each statement, we would like you to tell us how strongly you agree or disagree.’
The survey randomized the order of the batteries, as well as the order of the items within each battery.
Economic individualism only appears in Study 2.
Table 3.1: Question wordings for each core value
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The problem, however, is that qualitative case studies, anecdote, and intuition alone—
rather than systematic empirical testing—form the foundation of this conclusion. This
is in sharp contrast to the rich behavioral literature on core values, which argues that an
individual’s issue positions are a function not only of her partisan self-interest but also of
her “deeply held. . . enduring” (Alvarez and Brehm, 2002, p.18), “bedrock” (Goren, 2005,
p.881) beliefs about “desirable modes of conduct or desirable end-states of existence”
(Rokeach, 1973, p.7). By their nature values are: 1) normative (i.e., they provide an
ideal standard against which to judge items); 2) abstract and “transsituational” (i.e., these
standards are applicable to many items and settings); 3) enduring (i.e., an individual
develops these standards early in her life through socialization to, and reinforcement
by, the dominant ethos); and, 4) economical (i.e., to judge an item, an individual need
not collect detailed information; rather, she need only assess the extent to which it is
consistent or inconsistent with her ideal standards) (Schwartz, 1994, p.21; Converse,
1964, p.211; Feldman, 1988; McClosky and Zaller, 1984; Alvarez and Brehm, 2002; cf.
McCann, 1997; Goren, 2005, on the influence of partisan ID on the updating of values).
As such, core values can provide a powerful, emotionally-intense, extra-partisan way by
which an individual can evaluate most policy proposals—support the policy if it advances
her concept of the common good, oppose it if it does not. Indeed, scholars have found core
values to influence people’s positions on an array of issues (e.g., Feldman, 1988; McCann,
1997; Alvarez and Brehm, 2002; Craig et al., 2005). This said, existing scholarship has
not yet applied core values to the issue of electoral design and voting rights.
Social psychologists have posited a number of values (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1994),
a handful of which political scientists have taken up and operationalized via survey items.
mute and even overwhelm the independent effect of partisanship,” they write. “. . . partisan self-interest
was the dominant force in voter reasoning about electoral rules—but [is] only. . . part of the picture.
People’s views of what elections should do clearly matter as well” (p.39; emphasis added).
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In the present study, I consider four values: 1) egalitarianism, i.e., the belief that all
people should have an equal opportunity to get ahead in life; 2) moral tolerance, i.e.,
a willingness to accept, or at least abide, individuals whose lifestyles are different from
the societal norm; 3) economic individualism, i.e., the belief in a strong work ethic,
particularly as a means to individual success; and, 4) self-reliance, i.e., the belief that,
to get ahead in life, one should rely not on others but on herself.3 These four values
should be germane to the issue of electoral rule choice, because they speak to notions of
fairness, inclusion, representativeness, equality, and self-worth—that is, the very ideals
that would-be democratic architects must translate into institutional design (Dahl, 1989,
ch.8). With core values an individual easily can assess electoral rules, whether a status
quo or a possible alternative, relative to her ideal standards (of how an election ought to
look, the individuals it ought to include, and the collective outcomes it ought to produce)
and then promote or stymie change, accordingly.4
3.2.2 Mapping core values onto the access/integrity trade-off
One way in which core values should manifest in election design is the trade-off between
increased access (of voters to the electoral process) and increased integrity (of the state
3 Depending on the study, these common core values go by different names—e.g., egalitarianism is
sometimes termed ‘equal opportunity’. Moreover, and depending on the needs of the researcher, their
items may be combined or disaggregated, edited or supplemented (e.g., Goren’s decision to split the
established ANES moral traditionalism battery into ‘moral tolerance’ and ‘traditionalism,’ which he—
correctly, in my opinion—views as seperate concepts; see, in particular, the appendix in Goren, 2005,
p.894–95; I do not use traditionalism, as it does not pertain to the domain of election reform).
4 It is worth quoting Dahl (1989, p.43; emphasis added) at length: “How we may best interpret
our democratic standards, apply them to a specific association and create the political practices and
institutions they require is, of course, no simple task. To do so we must plunge headlong into political
realities, where our choices will require innumerable theoretical and practical judgments. . . about trade-
offs among conflicting values.”
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over the process)—the former occurs when the government passes a law that makes
it easier to vote or that protects the right of its citizens to vote, whereas the latter
makes it easier for election officials to detect, prevent, and punish fraudulent voting.5
Importantly, each side believes that the election ought to be ‘fairer’ (and thus its outcome
‘more legitimate’) but has a very different idea of how to “protect the value of the vote.”
Access advocates worry that burdensome or discriminatory rules will exclude qualified
voters from the electoral process; therefore, they desire to ‘open things up.’ Integrity
advocates, conversely, worry that lax rules (and enforcement) will lead to the inclusion
of disqualified persons in the electorate; they thus hope to ‘zip things up’ (Ansolabehere,
2007; Streb, 2015, ch.2; Cain, 2014, p.30–31; Biggers and Hanmer, 2017).
For egalitarianism and moral tolerance, positive identifiers should support increased
access/oppose increased integrity, because each places the onus on society to ensure that
electoral institutions are properly inclusive, reducing problematic barriers where neces-
sary. If overly-burdensome rules and high costs of voting (e.g., Blais, 2000) generate
inequalities in the opportunity to participate (make it hard for certain voices, however
repugnant, to be heard), then the egalitarian (tolerant person) wants these barriers re-
duced. Conversely, positive identifiers on economic individualism and self-reliance should
support increased integrity/oppose increased access. This is because each places the onus
on the individual to ensure that they are included in society’s institutions, rising above
adversity when required. If overly-burdensome rules and high costs of voting are pre-
venting people from participating, then the economic individualist (self-reliance adherent)
5 Certainly, there are other questions of design to which core values could be applicable, including: 1)
majoritarian-induced stability versus proportional-induced descriptive representation (Lijphart, 1994);
equality of vote weight versus geographic over-representation (Virgin, 2017); technology-induced ease of
voting versus concerns over security (Alvarez and Hall, 2010); populist versus pluralist reform traditions
(Cain, 2014), etc. Indeed, these other manifestations provide an opportunity for future research on the
values motivation.
42
responds ‘too bad’—effort and planning will get a person to the polls if they want to
vote (a person shouldn’t need help to do something that they can do on their own).
3.2.3 Hypotheses
Based upon the above discussion, I develop the following four interrelated, preregistered6
hypotheses about the relationship between political predispositions and support for elec-
toral reform. H1 tests the canonical partisan self-interest motivation, whereas H2.a and
H2.b, together, assess the core values alternative. H3 refers to situations in which an
individual receives information pertinent to both of her predispositions, but with them
set in opposition to each other (i.e., countervailed):
◦ H1: If an electoral reform advances (undermines) an individual’s partisan goals,
then she will be more (less) likely to support the proposal. + (–)
◦ H2.a: If an electoral reform advances an individual’s value identification (mani-
fested via the access/integrity trade-off), then she will be more likely to support
the proposal. (+)
◦ H2.b: If an electoral reform undermines an individual’s value identification (mani-
fested via the access/integrity trade-off), then she will be less likely to support the
proposal. (–)
◦ H3: If an electoral reform advances one of an individual’s predispositional goals
but undermines the other, then she will be ambivalent; yet, partisan self-interest
may determine the effect’s sign.
3.2.4 Selecting an electoral rule
An experiment on electoral reform first needs a rule to reform. Certainly, there is no
shortage of electoral rules to which the access/integrity trade-off applies: absentee voting,
voter I.D., in-person early voting, automatic voter registration (i.e., ‘motor voter’), same-
day voter registration, etc. (see Streb, 2015, ch.2). For my purposes, however, some
6 Preregistered content, hosted by the Center for Open Science, is available at https://osf.io/suyv8/.
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of the most obvious candidates are not appropriate due to their high-salience and/or
(perceived) non-neutrality. The problem with a rule that features in partisan warfare
is that it increases the odds of a survey respondent importing ‘foreign’ knowledge (and
passion) into the survey and bringing this information to bear on her answers on the
dependent variable—i.e., ‘contaminating’ the design (described in the next section) by
making a given treatment less (or, perhaps, more) believable. For example, voter I.D.
laws—the epitome of a partisan-biased, highly-salient electoral rule—likely would imperil
the manipulation because popular discussion of this issue is both ubiquitous and fervid.
A low-salience, neutral rule, then, provides for a more auspicious test. After assessing
the neutrality of the five rules via a pilot survey,7 I determined that absentee voting—i.e.,
provisions that permit a voter to cast a ballot by mail if she is unable or, in some states,
unwilling to vote in-person at her polling place8—possesses the necessary qualities.
3.3 Experimental design
The objectives of this study are: 1) to isolate the effect of core values, as manifested
via the access/integrity trade-off, on support for electoral reform; and, 2) to observe
what happens when partisan self-interest and core values combine to countervail each
other.9 I therefore am interested in both the independent and interactive (with partisan
self-interest) effects of core values on citizens’ support for electoral reform. To evaluate
7 See the Appendix for the results of this pilot. I concede that the selection of a perceived neutral
rule adds to this project a scope condition that may affect the generalizability of the finding to conditions
that feature a non-neutral rule.
8 See http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx; I do
not make use of the distinction between ‘excuse-only’ and ‘no-excuse’ absentee voting, as I believe these
details are too technical for a survey.
9 To validate the instrument, I also isolate the effect of partisan self-interest (i.e., expected party
electoral fortunes) on support for electoral reform. These results, fully consistent with the canonical
approach, can be found in the Appendix.
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these causal relationships, I have developed and preregistered an experimental design
that manipulates the manner in which a given electoral reform policy is framed, holding
all else constant.
3.3.1 Factors and vignettes
I employ a two-factor, between-subjects factorial design that randomly assigns respon-
dents into one of eight treatment conditions; importantly, treatment assignment does
not depend upon the subject’s predispositional profile: any treatment is available to any
subject (see subsection 3.3.2, in particular Tables 3.3 and 3.4). The instrument is a
vignette—presented as a news story but written by the investigator10—that manipulates
the framing of a reform proposal on absentee voting. A factor has two available frames,
each of which is molar: 1) for partisan self-interest, as either helping (hurting) Democrat-
s/hurting (helping) Republicans; and, 2) for core values, as either increasing (decreasing)
10 To make the vignettes as externally valid as possible (e.g., Mutz, 2011), I searched Nexis Uni
for news stories on absentee voting (search: “absentee vote” OR “absentee voting” AND reform). The
stories I selected, and subsequently modeled, were written between 2000–12 and ran in local or national
newspapers. They are as follows:
◦ John M. Broder, “Growing Absentee Voting Is Reshaping Campaigns,” The New York Times, 22
Oct. 2000.
◦ Mike McIntire, “Absentee Voting Rules Reform Sought,” The Associated Press, 17 Nov. 2000.
◦ David Pitt, “Election Reform Bill Veto Will Not Threaten Federal Dollars,” The Associated Press,
23 Apr. 2003.
◦ Richard Halstead, “Popularity of Absentee Voting Changing Elections,” Marin Independent Jour-
nal, 20 Sep. 2004.
◦ Jim Wooten, “Our Opinion: Not All Voting Reforms Work,” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution,
20 Mar. 2005.
◦ Adam Liptak, “Error and Fraud at Issue as Absentee Voting Rises,” The New York Times, 7 Oct.
2012.
In addition to external validity, the stories also provide proof of concept with respect to the permis-
sibility of molar treatments (footnote 11) and the incredibility of a control group (footnote 12).
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Partisan self-interest frames
(1) None (2) Helps Dems. (3) Helps Reps.
V
al
ue
s
fr
am
es (A) None Dems. Reps.
(B) Pro-voter access Access Dems. + Access Reps. + Access
(C) Pro-electoral integrity Integrity Dems. + Integrity Reps. + Integrity
Notes: Cell A1 is blank because the experimental design omits a pure control group.
Table 3.2: Treatment groups in terms of partisan-self interest and core values
voter access/decreasing (increasing) electoral integrity.11
The factorial design allows me to control the number of factors to which a respondent
is exposed (Shadish et al., 2002, p.263). In the first two conditions (cells A2 and A3
in Table 3.2) the subject receives a news story that discusses the reform proposal only
in terms its partisan effects (i.e., partisan single-factor conditions), thus priming her
partisan self-interest. The helps-Democrats (Republicans) version of the story reads:
. . . If implemented, the proposal is—on balance—expected to advantage the
Democratic (Republican) Party. Democrats (Republicans), as a result, are
on board: they see an opportunity to achieve electoral gains. “This proposal
would help us to advance our overall agenda,” says Democratic (Republican)
strategist Todd Bennett. “Changing absentee voting means more Democratic
11 I use molar treatments for two reasons. First, with respect to partisan self-interest, a two-party
system such as the U.S.’s is zero-sum and thus one major party frame invariably implies the other.
Second, with respect to access and integrity, journalists typically discuss an electoral reform proposal
using the language of one in tandem with that of the other. The limitation of molarity is an attendant
inability to tell which piece of the dual-sided frame is responsible for driving the effect on the dependent
variable (Cook and Campbell, 1979, p.32–33). That said, molar treatments are more externally valid
than the alternative.
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(Republican) officeholders, which means the ability to advance progressive
(conservative) causes across the country.” . . .
In the second two conditions (B1 and C1 in Table 3.2) the subject receives a news story
that discusses the reform only in terms of its implications for voter access and electoral
integrity (i.e., values single-factor conditions), thus priming her core values. The pro-
access (pro-integrity) version of the news story reads:
. . . If implemented, the proposal is—on balance—expected to make it easier to
vote absentee (guard against voter fraud). As such, voter access (electoral in-
tegrity) advocates are lining up behind the proposal: they have long believed
the current system makes it too hard (easy) for well (ill)-intentioned individ-
uals to exercise their right to vote (cast an unlawful vote). “This proposal
would open (zip) up the electoral process,” says John Lange, a proponent
of expanded access (electoral integrity). “Legitimizing our elections by mak-
ing voting more convenient (encouraging in-person voting) is consistent with
America’s larger commitment to equality (honesty) and inclusion (security).”
. . .
Finally, in the remaining four conditions the subject receives a news story that uses both
factors (B2, B3, C2, and C3)—i.e., unique combinations of the four single-factor vignette
options. These conditions thus prime both of her political predispositions.12
3.3.2 Two-step coding of respondents
The theory, however, is not about which vignette a subject receives, but rather how that
treatment relates to her partisan and core values predispositions. To obtain information
12 Any control group (A1 in Table 3.2) would have needed to eschew content about the partisan and
core values implications of the reform proposal. This would have introduced two problems. First, it is not
obvious how subjects in the control group would have been able to evaluate a policy absent information
on its predicted effects. One possibility is that these respondents would have read-in a ‘foreign’ partisan
self-interest, thereby contaminating the analysis. Second, a control version of the news story would
not have been externally valid given the implausibility of real-world journalists stripping their stories of
partisan/values-based content (see footnote 10). As such, I decided to omit a pure control.
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Single-factor treatment vignettes
Helps Dems. Helps Reps. Pro-access Pro-integrity
R
es
po
nd
en
t’
s
pr
ed
is
po
si
ti
on
s
Egalitarian Dem. Partisancongruent
Partisan
incongruent
Value
congruent
Value
incongruent
Egalitarian Rep. Partisanincongruent
Partisan
congruent
Value
congruent
Value
incongruent
Inegalitarian Dem. Partisancongruent
Partisan
incongruent
Value
incongruent
Value
congruent
Inegalitarian Rep. Partisanincongruent
Partisan
congruent
Value
incongruent
Value
congruent
Notes: The table uses egalitarianism as an example; any of the other core values may substitute in.
Table 3.3: Predispositional routes to each single-factor code
on each subject’s predispositional profile, I ask a series of questions, pre-stimulus. For
partisan self-interest, I use the standard two-question partisan I.D. battery, which allows
me to code a subject as either a Democrat, an Independent, or a Republican. As is
standard practice, each partisan group includes strong identifiers, weak identifiers, and
leaners (i.e., subjects who, though selecting ‘independent’ or ‘other’ on the first question,
subsequently state that they are close to a major party on the second question). True
independents are those who answer ‘neither party’ to the follow-up question.
For each core value, I use a three-item battery that I have taken, albeit in modified
form, from Goren (2001, 2005) and Goren et al. (2009). Table 3.1 contains the text of all
12 questions; each item presented respondents with five options from which to choose,
ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree.’ The objective of each battery is
to ascertain whether a respondent is a positive identifier on its value (e.g., supports
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equal opportunity, moral tolerance, self-reliance, or economic individualism), a negative
identifier (i.e., opposes that respective quality), or is a non-identifier (i.e., is ambivalent
on the value). Relative to partisan I.D., a disciplinary standard for slicing the data is
less established. I opt for an appropriate middle-ground between being too exclusive
and too inclusive in terms of value identification. With each battery consisting of three
five-choice items, the lowest score possible is 0, whereas the highest is 12. As cut points,
I code respondents with a score of 8–12 (0–4) as positive (negative) identifiers, while
non-identifiers are those with a score of 5–7.
Having outlined the first step of the coding process, it is possible to proceed to the next
step: determining whether a respondent’s randomized treatment assignment is congruent
with her predisposition(s), incongruent, or somewhere in-between. The building blocks
of this scheme are:
◦ Partisan congruent (P+): the reform was framed as helping the subject’s party
◦ Partisan incongruent (P–): the reform was framed as helping the opposing party
◦ Value congruent (V+): the reform was framed as advancing the side of the ac-
cess/integrity trade-off that is, according to theory, consistent with the subject’s
value identification
◦ Value incongruent (V–): the reform was framed as undermining the side of the
access/integrity trade-off that is, according to theory, consistent with the subject’s
value identification
For subjects in one of the four single-factor treatment groups, the above codes are suf-
ficient and exhaustive. As seen in Table 3.3, any coding can result from any predispo-
sitional profile. So, for example, on the core value of egalitarianism, a value congruent
coding can result from an egalitarian respondent receiving the pro-access version of the
news story or from an inegalitarian receiving the pro-integrity vignette (these cells are
shaded gray in Table 3.3). For the double-factor conditions, the above building blocks
must be combined, since each subject is exposed to both factors:
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Double-factor treatment vignettes
Helps Dems.
+ Pro-access
Helps Reps.
+ Pro-access
Helps Dems.
+ Pro-integ.
Helps Reps.
+ Pro-integ.
R
es
po
nd
en
t’
s
pr
ed
is
po
si
ti
on
s
Tolerant Dem. Combinedcongruent
Value-led
countervailed
Partisan-led
countervailed
Combined
incongruent
Tolerant Rep. Value-ledcountervailed
Combined
congruent
Combined
incongruent
Partisan-led
countervailed
Intolerant Dem. Partisan-ledcountervailed
Combined
incongruent
Combined
congruent
Value-led
countervailed
Intolerant Rep. Combinedincongruent
Partisan-led
countervailed
Value-led
countervailed
Combined
congruent
Notes: The table uses moral tolerance as an example; any of the other core values may substitute in.
Table 3.4: Predispositional routes to each double-factor code
◦ Combined congruent (V+/P+): the reform was framed as helping the subject’s
party and as advancing her value identification (i.e., a ‘double positive’)
◦ Combined incongruent (V–/P–): the reform was framed as hurting the subject’s
party and as undermining her value identification (i.e., a ‘double negative’)
◦ Value-led countervailed (V+/P–): the reform was framed as advancing the subject’s
value identification but also as hurting her party
◦ Partisan-led countervailed (V–/P+): the reform was framed as helping the subject’s
party but also as undermining her value identification
As seen in Table 3.4, any of the four above codings can result from any predispositional
profile (I have shaded gray the four routes to the combined congruent coding). Im-
portantly, and due to orthogonality between treatment assignment and predispositional
profile, the experimental design does not require the existence, in the survey sample,
of respondents with ‘mismatched’ or ‘off-diagonal’ profiles (e.g., tolerant Republicans,
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intolerant Democrats in Table 3.4)—in order to countervail subjects. ‘Matched’ or ‘on-
diagonal’ profiles can easily result in a countervailing coding (e.g., a tolerant Democrat
in the Helps Reps. + Pro-access vignette).
3.3.3 Analytical strategy
To test the above mentioned hypotheses, I estimate a series of one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) tests, a method that allows a researcher to assess the extent to which the
means of three or more groups differ from each other on a single, shared dependent
variable. The null hypothesis is that the group means are statistically indistinguishable
from each other, whereas the alternative hypothesis is that (at least two of) the groups
are different. Below, each model includes three groups and uses the Bonferroni method
to obtain post-hoc, pairwise comparisons. Moreover, all models exclude respondents
who are non-identifiers on either partisan I.D. or the focal core value.13 The dependent
variable is support for the reform proposal, measured post-stimulus via a five-point Likert
scale, recoded such that −2 is ‘strongly oppose,’ 0 is ‘neither support nor oppose,’ and 2
is ‘strongly support.’
Each ANOVA holds constant a unique single-factor coding across its three groups,
which makes possible inferences about the effect of the other, varying predisposition.
Indeed, the single-factor in each trio is best thought of as a make-shift control group
against which the corresponding double-factor may be compared. The constituent pieces
of each ANOVA, as well as a brief explanation for its construction, are as follows:
1. Value congruent (V+), combined congruent (V+/P+), and value-led countervailed
(V+/P–). This ANOVA holds constant the reception of a congruent value frame,
allowing partisan-self interest to vary.
13 It is possible for a respondent to be an identifier on one core value but a non-identifier on a second.
In this case, she would be included in the analysis of the former, but dropped from analysis of the latter.
As such, the number of subjects used in each ANOVA can be—and is—different.
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Value Study Score distribution Percent identifiers
Median Mean Range Pos. Neutral Neg.
Egalitarianism
MTurk 10 9.16 0–12 74.55 13.10 12.35
SSItotal 10 9.69 0–12 80.05 16.06 3.89
SSIcompliers 10 9.74 0–12 81.12 14.57 4.31
Moral tolerance
MTurk 9 8.34 0–12 66.45 18.38 15.17
SSItotal 8 7.62 0–12 53.91 34.60 11.48
SSIcompliers 8 7.79 0–12 57.72 28.14 14.14
Self-reliance
MTurk 5 4.56 0–12 49.01 37.89 13.10
SSItotal 4 3.78 0–12 62.75 32.36 4.90
SSIcompliers 3 3.47 0–12 67.34 26.92 5.74
Economic
individualism
SSItotal 5 4.98 0–12 43.40 42.55 14.05
SSIcompliers 5 5.18 0–12 42.64 38.55 18.81
Notes: The full scale for each value is 0 to 12 points, with 8–12 resulting in a positive identifier (i.e., an
egalitarian, a tolerant individual, a self-reliance adherent, an economic individualist); and, 0–4 resulting
in a negative identifier (i.e., an inegalitarian, an intolerant individual, a rely-on-others adherent, an eco-
nomic universalist). Non-identifiers score 5–7. I have colored gray those identifiers expected, according
to theory, to favor increased voter access.
Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics for the four core values, by study
2. Value incongruent (V–), combined incongruent (V–/P–), and partisan-led coun-
tervailed (V–/P+). This ANOVA holds constant the reception of an incongruent
value frame, allowing partisan-self interest to vary.
3. Partisan congruent (P+), combined congruent (V+/P+), and partisan-led conter-
vailed (V–/P+). This ANOVA holds constant the reception of a congruent partisan
frame, allowing the core value to vary.
4. Partisan incongruent (P–), combined incongruent (V–/P–), and value-led coun-
tervailed (V+/P–).This ANOVA holds constant the reception of a incongruent
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partisan frame, allowing the core value to vary.
Together, the first two tests isolate the net effect of partisan self-interest (i.e., the canon-
ical approach, or H1), by holding constant the directionality of the focal core value. The
last two tests isolate the net effect of the focal core value (H2.a and H2.b) by holding con-
stant the directionality of partisan self-interest. Finally, because each ANOVA contains
a countervailed factor, all four can be used to assess H3.
3.4 Findings
I utilize this experimental design for two separate studies, each of which required respon-
dents to answer every question and prohibited them from advancing the vignette until
at least 30 seconds had elapsed.
3.4.1 Study 1 – Recruitment and data
For Study 1, fielded on 2 July and on 1 August 2018, I recruited 1061 subjects from
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk Internet-based crowd-sourcing platform. Workers selected
voluntarily into the study after viewing an advertisement posted on the MTurk website;
they had a maximum of one hour to complete the task and were compensated $1.60 for
their time. The survey screened out subjects younger than 18-years old and subjects
located outside the U.S.14 A convenience sample, the MTurk draw is, as expected, not
nationally-representative. In this case, it skews Democratic (53.82%), young (48.63%
between 18–30-years old), educated (60.32% with a Bachelor’s degree or higher), and
male (61.92%).15 With respect to the values positions of respondents, Table 3.5 displays
14 The survey set worker qualifications to ensure high performance. The qualifications are approval
HIT rate ≥ 90% and number of HITS approved ≥ 100.
15 For a discussion of MTurk’s strengths and weaknesses, see Berinsky et al. (2012); Buhrmester et al.
(2011); Anson (2018).
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descriptive statistics for the distributions of egalitarianism, moral tolerance, and self-
reliance—both the raw scores on the battery of each, as well as the subsequent coding
of subjects. (Note: economic individualism does not appear in Study 1.)
3.4.2 Results
The primacy of partisan self-interest on the issue of electoral rule choice is so firmly
established in the literature that it is no exaggeration to call it canon, and indeed, failure
to recover this expected relationship could indicate poor instrument design. However,
the factorial design consistently finds that partisan self-interest has a statistically and
substantively significant effect on support for the proposal: whether we hold constant the
reception of a congruent value frame (i.e., V+, via the six iterations of ANOVA.1) or of
an incongruent one (i.e., V–, via ANOVA.2), subjects who are told that the reform will
help their preferred party (i.e., P+) are always more likely than the baseline to support
the change; similarly, subjects who read that their party will be hurt (i.e., P–) are always
less likely to support. Importantly, this pattern is robust across both the MTurk and SSI
samples and regardless of which of the four core values stands in for ‘V.’ (Due to space
constraints, the figures for ANOVA 1 and ANOVA 2 are reserved for the Appendix.) The
data thus support H1.
At issue, however, is that the proposal and validation of partisan self-interest is where
existing scholarship on electoral reform stops. By contrast, the present paper is the first
to provide core values a rebuttal, both isolating their net effects and pitting them head-
to-head against partisan concerns. Figure 3.1 graphically displays the results for the
three values utilized in Study 1: egalitarianism, moral tolerance, and self-reliance. As
noted in the previous section, ANOVA 3 (ANOVA 4) holds constant the reception of
a positive (negative) partisan self-interest frame, allowing the focal core value to vary
between incongruent (V–), none, and congruent (V+); p-values (two-tailed) for each
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Notes: ANOVA.3 holds constant the reception of a congruent partisan self-interest factor (P+), allowing
the focal core value factor to vary between incongruent (V–), none, and congruent (V+). Similarly,
ANOVA.4 holds constant the reception of an incongruent partisan self-interest factor (P–), again allowing
the focal value to vary. For each test, then, any difference between the groups on mean support for the
reform proposal must be due to the varying ‘V.’ Finally, p-values (Bonferroni corrected, two-tailed)
appear above the dotted lines.
Figure 3.1: The effects of core values for Study 1, MTurk sample
pairwise comparison appear above the dotted lines. Looking first at egalitarianism and
moral tolerance, we find strong substantive and statistically significant support for H2.a:
the reception of a congruent values frame (V+) always makes the respondents more likely
to support the reform. This occurs irrespective of whether the subject has been told the
reform will help her party (i.e., combined congruent, V+/P+), in which case she becomes
even more likely to favor the proposal relative to the single-factor baseline (P+); or that
the reform will hurt her party (i.e., values-led countervailed, V+/P–), in which case she
abandons her single-factor baseline opposition and becomes neutral-to-supportive. This
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latter point shows the ability of egalitarianism and tolerance to overwhelm, and thus
reverse, the opposing pull of partisan self-interest.
The results on H2.b, however, are mixed: the reception of an incongruent values
frame (V–) on egalitarianism and moral tolerance sometimes follows theory, and at other
times, it does not. First, a respondent who is told the reform will both hurt her party and
undermine her value identification (i.e., combined incongruent, V–/P–) never emerges
as more likely, relative to the single-factor baseline (P–), to oppose the reform; thus,
a ‘double negative,’ as it were, has no effect. But, in support of H2.b, a respondent
who is told that the proposal will help her party but undermine her value identification
is, in fact, less likely to support the reform, although this time the sign of the effect is
(as theorized) determined by the congruent partisan factor. Nevertheless, the fact that
people become more ambivalent reflects, again, the motivational power of core values—
they have attenuated the effect of partisan concerns. In total, across H2 (i.e., regardless
of whether we use V+ or V–) for egalitarianism and moral tolerance, the countervailing
situations represent the strongest evidence to date that partisan concerns are but a partial
explanation for electoral reform—people pursue values-based objectives, too.
Thus far, I have omitted self-reliance from the discussion. This is because nothing
about the results is as expected theoretically. On the one hand, this could be evidence
that, although the survey instrument worked, individualist-based core values such as self-
reliance merely are not pertinent to position-taking on the issue of electoral rule choice
(as manifested via the access/integrity trade-off). On the other hand, it could be that
the instrument was faulty and that, if the quality of the self-reliance items was improved,
we might yet detect an effect. I tend toward the latter explanation and utilize Study 2
to improve the operationalization of this underlying value concept.
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Notes: ANOVA.3 and ANOVA.4 each allow the focal core value to vary, but hold constant the reception
of congruent (P+) and incongruent (P–) partisan self-interest factors, respectively. The focal core value,
then, must drive the result. Bonferroni corrected p-values (two-tailed) appear above the dotted lines.
Figure 3.2: The effects of core values for Study 2, total sample
3.4.3 Study 2 – Recruitment and data
The results of Study 1 provide strong, initial evidence that individuals do, indeed, utilize
their core values when taking a position on electoral rule choice. That said, Study 1
has two limitations. First, the sample is not representative of the broader U.S. adult
population, and therefore, the findings may not be externally valid. Second, the self-
reliance battery (the lone ‘individualist’ value in Study 1) did not perform as expected,
perhaps indicating an issue with the instrument. To address these problems, I opted
to field a second study, replicating the design from Study 1 with minor changes—most
notably the addition of the economic individualism battery (see Table 3.1) as a substitute
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for self-reliance.
For Study 2, piloted between 23 July–1 August 2018, and further fielded between 2–19
August, I recruited 2491 subjects from Survey Sampling International’s Internet-based,
pre-contracted panel of respondents; panelists selected voluntarily into the study after
seeing the task as an option in their personal SSI portfolio. In addition to retaining the
three in-survey screeners used in Study 1, I added a fourth screener to terminate pure
independents, since non-identifiers are not germane to the theory (and were ‘wasted’ in
Study 1).16 Because SSI manages which of its panelists view the survey, the resulting
sample for Study 2 is much more nationally-representative: 25.09% between 18–30-years
old; 39.06% with a Bachelor’s degree or higher; and, 45.85% male. In terms of partisan
I.D., 51.30% of respondents are Democrats and 48.70% are Republicans (again, indepen-
dents were screened out.) Of particular note, however, is that the sample—and despite
SSI’s efforts at course correction in-field—suffered from a high rate of non-compliance,
assessed via a two-item manipulation check:17 27.10% of respondents failed one item,
whereas another 16.98% failed both. As such, for the analysis that follows, I run all
16 Similarly screening out core values non-identifiers was not possible for two reasons. First, and
unlike partisan I.D., it takes too many questions (see Table 3.1)—and post-survey coding—to determine
a subject’s value identification quickly; therefore, it would have been unfair not to compensate these
individuals for their time. Second, it is possible for a subject to be a non-identifier on a given core value
but an identifier on one or more others (see footnote 13).
17 The first item assessed respondents’ ability to recall the vignette’s focal policy, absentee voting
(“According to what you have just read in the news story, what electoral procedure allows a voter to
cast his or her ballot by mail if he or she is unable or unwilling to vote in-person?” Choices: ‘Absentee
voting’; ‘Provisional voting’; ‘Voter I.D.’; and, ‘Don’t know’). The second item asked respondents if the
vignette had portrayed the reform as being partisan in its effect (“Thinking back, did the news story
indicate whether the proposal would tend to favor a specific political party over the other?” Choices:
‘The news story says the proposal would favor the Republicans’; ‘The news story says the proposal would
favor the Democrats’; ‘The news story says the proposal would favor neither party over the other’; ‘The
news story did not provide this information’; and, ‘Don’t know’). For this item, the correct answer
depended on treatment assignment.
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models on the total sample (n = 2491), as well as the subset of respondents who passed
the manipulation check (n = 1393, with demographics: 52.84% Democratic and 47.16%
Republican; 15.79% between 18-30-years old; 38.05% with a Bachelor’s degree or higher;
and, 40.49% male).18 As before, value identification statistics—for the total sample and
for compliers only—appear in Table 3.5.
3.4.4 Results
As with Study 1, the results for partisan self-interest are strong, thereby providing ad-
ditional support for H1. (Again, due to space constraints, these figures appear in the
Appendix.) Figures 3.2 and 3.3 display the results of the total sample and of SSI com-
pliers only, respectively. With respect to egalitarianism and moral tolerance, in general,
Study 2 reproduces the results of Study 1, especially when subsetting on compliers; the
analysis of the total sample softens many of the patterns, although they still emerge as,
more or less, consistent with the MTurk sample. As such, I do not detail them further,
save for a brief remark that H2.a and H3 are supported, whereas again a test of H2.b has
a weak-to-no effect. The results for economic individualism, however, display the appli-
cability of individualist-based values to the issue domain of electoral reform. Regardless
of whether we look at the total sample or just compliers, the reception of a congruent
value frame (V+) always pulls a respondent’s level of support upwards relative to the
single-factor baseline (P+). The evidence for H3 is again strong: values-led countervailed
18 Unlike MTurk, SSI did not provide the option of using worker qualifications to screen out individuals
with histories of poor performance. When the first wave resulted in a 51.13% (n = 293/573) non-
compliance rate, SSI—to its credit—sought to boost respondent quality via the appending to the survey
of a pre-screener; this added text informed participants that the task would involve more reading than
typical for the platform. The result of this effort was discouraging, as the non-compliance rate for the
second wave was 57.02% (n = 134/235). Finally, SSI moved to terminate users using a mobile phone
(and dropped the pre-screener), which was successful: the third wave had a 42.86% (n = 105/245)
non-compliance rate. Data collection, then, continued in the fourth and final wave, using this method.
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Notes: ANOVA.3 and ANOVA.4 each allow the focal core value to vary, but hold constant the reception
of congruent (P+) and incongruent (P–) partisan self-interest factors, respectively. The focal core value,
then, must drive the result. Bonferroni corrected p-values (two-tailed) appear above the dotted lines.
Figure 3.3: The effects of core values for Study 2, SSI compliers only
(V+/P–) individuals follow their instincts on individualism, moving toward neutral when
they are told the reform will advance their value identification, irrespective of whether
their party is aided or harmed. As for H2.b, again, the reception of an incongruent
values frame does not have the expected effect, although in partisan-led countervailed
situations, it does at least move respondents toward neutral relative to the single-factor
baseline (P+); while indicative of the theorized effect, it does not rise to traditional levels
of statistical significance.
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3.5 Discussion and conclusion
The potential of electoral rules to affect who wins and who loses—especially when com-
bined with the zero-sum nature of U.S. elections—means that political parties, as the
key combatants in the electoral arena, face a strategic incentive to change the rules of the
game. As such, when a given party takes power, we expect to find a willingness among its
members (whether elites or identifiers in the mass public) to adopt reforms they believe
will help them in subsequent elections. Such is the story that the canonical, partisan
self-interest approach to electoral reform tells. The differential partisan implications of
an electoral reform are indeed important, even “dominant.” My argument is not that
partisan self-interest is inconsequential or even secondary in importance, but rather that
it is neither solely determinative nor exhaustive, and often, may have to either work in
concert with, or labor to counteract, other sources of motivation for electoral reform.
In this paper, I have examined the effects of one such motivation, predispositional core
values (including egalitarianism, moral tolerance, self-reliance, and economic individual-
ism). Furthermore, I have forced them to compete with partisan self-interest. Each of
these contributions fills existing gaps in the literature.
To do so, I developed an original experimental design that simultaneously manipulates
the partisan- and values-implications of a fictitious reform proposal on absentee voting. I
fielded survey experiments via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and Survey Sampling
International (SSI), collecting information on each respondent’s partisan and core values
identifications and then recoding each subject according to whether her treatment was
congruent or incongruent with her predispositional profile. A difference of means analysis
reveals strong evidence of a role for core values: not only do they have an important effect
net of partisan concerns, but also, they dramatically attenuate the effect of partisan self-
interest in instances in which the two predispositions have been made to countervail. The
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results, then, not only demonstrate that partisan self-interest provides a partial picture
of reform, but also displays the underappreciated, general power of core values to wash
out partisan effects when the two predispositions are placed in opposition to each other.
The current project, then, provides numerous opportunities for future research. Per-
haps most obviously, I have not manipulated (as a third factor) the topic of the reform
proposal, choosing instead to use absentee voting as the focal rule across all treatments.
Left unresolved, then, is the extent to which my findings would transfer to decision-
making on other types of electoral rules, especially those that, and unlike absentee voting,
are: 1) highly-salient and perceptually non-neutral (e.g., voter I.D. laws; see Biggers,
2018); or, 2) ‘major,’ structural formulae that influence the translation of vote shares
into seats and offices (Lijphart, 1994; Katz, 2005; Jacobs and Leyenaar, 2011; Leyenaar
and Hazan, 2011). It is possible that, for the first type of rules, partisan concerns would
overwhelm the motivational pull of core values, because the relationship between the
proposed change and (expected) differential partisan turnout dominates news coverage.
On the other hand, proposed dramatic, structural changes may provide an opportunity
for core values to trump ‘mere’ partisan machinations, because the very identity of a
country—and its people—could be at stake. While the present study offers a neces-
sary first step, future scholarship must force core values to battle partisan-self interest
on the least and most auspicious turfs imaginable, in order to establish the lower and
upper-bounds on their influence.
A second extension of the current project is to move the level of analysis from the
mass public to that of state or federal lawmakers. After all, political elites (rather than
survey respondents) tend to control the reform process—what Renwick (2010, p.10–
16) has termed “elite-majority imposition.” While elites occasionally lose control of the
reform process to ordinary citizens (e.g., via initiatives or referenda, public outrage,
scandal, etc.), they tend not to, and so it is therefore important to establish whether
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the key decision-makers of representative democracy, too, utilize core values when taking
action on this issue. While observational approaches are a natural avenue for such an
exploration, political science lacks good measures of lawmakers’ core value identifications;
as such, survey experiment or text-analysis methods may prove more fruitful. This said,
the citizen-level analysis of the present study offers the proof-of-concept upon which to
construct a sampling of elites’ predispositions—for if the public uses core values to decide
on electoral reform, then so too should the elites who work within, as well as shape and
prime, the value identifications of voters (Goren, 2001, 2005; Renwick, 2010, p.18)
Finally, and irrespective of the level of analysis, the four core values I have explored in
this paper are those that previous survey research in political science has established and
refined (e.g., Feldman, 1988; Goren, 2001, 2005)—but this list is far from exhaustive.
In social psychology, for instance, both Rokeach (1973) and, more recently, Schwartz
(1994) conceptualize and measure many additional values, some of which, too, could
be germane to issues of electoral design, operation, and participation (‘value families,’
or “motivational types,” such as security, conformity, and self-direction come to mind;
see Schwartz, 1994, p.22–25). While I suspect that other values also are pertinent to
electoral rule choice, caution is necessary before generalizing the present study’s results
to them: their effects may be much weaker than those observed for egalitarianism, moral
tolerance, and individualism, each of which, after all, was selected, in part, because a
persuasive case could be made for its applicability the electoral domain. In short, scholars
of electoral reform would do well to put additional core values to the test. My hope is that
the present paper will contribute to the discipline by sketching a fuller, more nuanced
picture of the motivational underpinnings of the electoral reform process.
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Chapter 4
Take your foreign rules and shove ’em:
The effect of exceptionalism on Americans’ support for electoral reform
4.1 Introduction to the chapter
On October 3, 2018, the Bangor Public Library hosted a discussion on ranked-choice vot-
ing (RCV) titled “What Australia’s Experience with RCV Can Teach Maine,” featuring
Perth-based political scientist, Benjamin Reilly.1 Three months earlier, in June, Mainers
had approved Question 1, a people’s veto of the State Legislature’s October 2017 decision
to delay the implementation of RCV statewide; Maine’s use of RCV in 2018, therefore,
was back on, and in November it would become the first U.S. state to use this system for
its federal general elections.2 Noting that 2018 also marked the centennial of Australia’s
adoption of RCV (there called ‘preferential voting’), Reilly told his American audience
that surprised Aussies had been following the news from Maine “very closely,” thinking
to themselves, “Wow, it’s [ME’s “borrowing” of RCV] actually going to happen.” In addi-
tion, Reilly also remarked on the state’s opportunity to address some of RCV’s practical
inefficiencies, via innovation in voting technologies: “If you guys get this right, then we’ll
probably end up borrowing it [next-generation RCV] back from you,” he joked.3
1 I would like to thank committee members Larry Bartels, Josh Clinton, Dave Lewis, Zeynep Somer-
Topcu, and Liz Zechmeister. Additional thanks is due to colleagues Dan Alexander, Drew Engelhardt,
James Martherus, and Michael Shepherd. Support for this project was provided by the Department
of Political Science and Vanderbilt University through the J. Leiper award. A research design for this
paper was presented at the MPSA 2019.
2 For a timeline of Maine’s RCV experiment, see: Ranked Choice Voting in Maine, Maine State Leg-
islature Law and Legislative Reference Library, http://legislature.maine.gov/lawlibrary/ranked-choice-
voting-in-maine/9509.
3 Benjamin Reilly, “What Australia’s Experience with RCV Can Teach Maine,” Speaking in Maine,
Maine Public Radio, 3 Oct. 2018, https://www.mainepublic.org/post/what-australias-experience-
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By highlighting RCV’s ‘made-in-Australia’ heritage, as well as its ‘modified-in-Maine’
potential, the above example illustrates two important points. First, many electoral rules
(especially those with a history of stable and—at least initially—exclusive usage) have
relatively clear national origins ; as such, they can in the eyes of elites and the mass public
“[come] to be seen as embodying aspects of [a given] national character” or democratic
tradition (Renwick, 2010, p.62). Second, just as countries exchange consumer goods and
industrial products between themselves, so too can they ‘import’ and ‘export’ policies
and institutional designs—i.e., the diffusion of a nationally-branded electoral rule across
geopolitical borders, from originating country a to receiving country b (e.g., Shipan
and Volden, 2008; Makse and Volden, 2011; Grossback et al., 2004). Provided such
‘country-of-origin’ information (Verlegh and Steenkamp, 1999; Shimp and Sharma, 1987;
Obermiller and Spangenberg, 1989) is made available to political actors in b, then opinion
about a and the desirability of modeling a may become part of b’s reform debate. No
longer is the question whether b should adopt a new way of doing things, but rather, if
b should adopt a’s way—i.e., converge towards a and forfeit some of its distinctiveness.
It is here that the motivation to reform electoral rules collides with national affect—or
put another way, that “the symbolism of [national] difference,” (Shafer, 1999, p.446) ei-
ther lost due to successful reform or safeguarded due to stymied reform, becomes salient.
National affect is a family of concepts—of which patriotism, nationalism, international-
ism, national identity, and exceptionalism are notable constituent members4—that refers
to the psychological relationship between an individual and her country; scholars of these
attitudes have documented both: 1) their motive effect; and, 2) the extent to which they
ranked-choice-voting-can-teach-maine. Reilly had earlier published an op-ed; see: Benjamin Reilly,
“A Century of Ranked Choice Voting in Australia Offers Lessons for Maine,” Bangor Daily News,
28 Aug. 2018, https://bangordailynews.com/2018/08/28/opinion/contributors/a-century-of-ranked-
choice-voting-in-australia-offers-lessons-for-maine/.
4 The reader is referred to Section 4.2 for a discussion of these attitudes and their operationalizations.
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vary among the mass public (Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989; Huddy and Khatib, 2007;
Sidanius et al., 1997; Schatz et al., 1999; Conover and Feldman, 1987; Ceaser, 2012; King-
don, 1999). Based on their differential national affect, individuals may, attitudinally, be
inclined (whether in absolute or relative terms) to welcome or to reject foreign influence
in the form of institutional diffusion.
An emphasis on national affect as a reason to promote or stymie electoral rule change
stands in stark contrast to the canonical understanding of reform: partisan self-interest.
This approach argues that, because the ‘rules of the game’ can affect who wins, parties
and their members strategically pursue (or are at least passively open to) rule changes
predicted to result in partisan gains (Benoit, 2007; Bowler and Donovan, 2013; Boix,
1999; Renwick, 2010; Colomer, 2005; Leyenaar and Hazan, 2011; Cain, 2014). This
approach has great appeal: not only is partisan identification an enduring and powerful,
group-based predisposition (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960; Green et al., 2004; Bartels, 2002),
but also: 1) most elections are organized around partisan competition for the right to
govern; and, 2) once elected or appointed, partisan officials control the very legislative
and executive offices in charge of administering elections and maintaining electoral rules.
Parties, therefore, undoubtedly have the motivation and the ability to act as electoral
reformers (Benoit, 2004). This conceded, it is also true that the electoral reform subfield
has only recently begun to investigate, both anecdotally (Renwick, 2010; Bowler and
Donovan, 2013) and empirically (Bowler et al., 2006; Virgin, 2017, nd) other, extra-
partisan motivations for reform. By attending to these neglected determinants, this group
of scholars has begun to address that Leyenaar and Hazan (2011, p.442–44) had earlier
characterized as a notable theoretical gap in the literature. In this paper, I continue this
enterprise by putting to the empirical test one such neglected extra-partisan motivation
for reform: a belief in American exceptionalism, a type of national affect here defined as
the belief that the U.S. is not only comparatively superior to other nations (i.e., the U.S.’s
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“special character”), but also has been tasked with helping foreign peoples to liberalize
their values and political institutions (i.e., the U.S.’s “special mission”) (Ceaser, 2012).
Heretofore, scholars of exceptionalism have focused on the veracity of its claim—i.e.,
whether or not the U.S. is truly comparatively distinct (Lipset, 1997; Shafer, 1991, 1999;
Wilson, 1998; Koh, 2002). In doing so, they have failed to examine exceptionalism as an
idea in which individuals believe and upon which they call in their decision-making on
issues. As Shafer (1999, p.446) has conceded:
If political actors believe in [exceptionalism] or, indeed, if they are agnostic
but can nevertheless use the symbolism of difference—to move public opinion,
to influence public policy, or to shape the policy process—then exceptional-
ism is a genuine and confirmedly empirical phenomenon. The accuracy or
inaccuracy, the truth or falsity, of the propositions allegedly constituting this
exceptionalism are not important. It is the use of the theme, and its successful
motive impact, that matters. (emphasis added)
In theory, exceptionalism in particular (and national affect in general) should be germane
to the issue of electoral rule choice because whereas the former extols the inherent virtue
of, and seeks to protect and spread, the ‘American way,’ the latter by definition chips
away at the U.S. status quo arrangement and, perhaps, forfeits the distinctive national
character of the system. As such, there is a natural tension between the objectives of
exceptionalism and the activity of institutional change, and the exceptionalist should
therefore be inclined to oppose reform, accordingly.
But do individuals deploy exceptionalist attitudes on the issue of electoral rule choice;
i.e., in the language of Schafer, when elites utilize this ‘theme’ (“the symbolism of dif-
ference”) to move opinion and to shape the policy debate, does it actually resonate with
people and play a role in their decision-making on the topic? Because the attitude of
exceptionalism cannot be randomly assigned among the population, I instead utilize an
interactive, between-subjects experimental design that randomly primes this considera-
tion to be at the top of a respondent’s mind when answering a question about whether
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or not she would support a given reform. Treated subjects are primed with content that
frames the proposed electoral alternative as “foreign,” “imported,” “European,” and “un-
American,” the salience of which should be conditional on the intensity of exceptionalist
attitude; untreated subjects, conversely, receive no such content and thus are not primed.
On a convenience sample hosted by Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, I find mixed evidence
of a role for exceptionalist attitudes. First of all, and irregardless of treatment assign-
ment, the relationship between exceptionalist sentiments and support for electoral reform
indeed is negative. Second, and when differentiating treatment from control, exception-
alists (non-exceptionalists) in the former appear more likely to oppose (support) the
reform than their counterparts in the control. The parenthetical result was not excepted
but, in hindsight, is consistent with the theory. Nevertheless, we cannot statistically dis-
tinguish the two conditions—likely due to an inadvertent ‘treating’ of the control group
with national affect-related, pre-stimulus content. In Section 4.2, I outline theory and
introduce hypotheses. In Section 4.3, I elaborate on the design; Section 4.4 introduces
data, the results, and discusses the accidental prime; and, Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 A theory of national attachment and elections
4.2.1 Why American exceptionalism?
The scholar wishing to study the effect of national affect on actors’ decision-making
certainly has a rich—and admittedly confusing—array of ‘–isms’ from which to choose.
On the one hand, this profusion reflects a certain scholarly sloppiness, due both to
the packaging of many concepts under the same label and the referencing of a given
concept by any number of names (the quintessential example is the torturous history of
‘patriotism’; see Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989, p.258–60). On the other hand, some of
this profusion is justified—and reflects good science. As Kosterman and Feshbach (1989)
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have demonstrated, respondents’ attitudes toward the in-nation (and out-nations) truly
are “multidimensional” in nature, and as such, it is a mistake to combine conceptually-
discrete attitudes into one, indiscriminate container (Sartori, 1970). A number of scholars
have since labored to achieve clarity, and the current state of the art is to distinguish
between: 1) patriotism, i.e., feeling pride in and love for America; 2) nationalism, i.e.,
the view that America is superior to other nations and should dominate them; and,
internationalism, i.e., a belief in global welfare and the universality of mankind.5 In the
same vein, Huddy and Khatib (2007) have cleaned-up the operationalization of patriotism
(cf. Conover and Feldman, 1987; Sidanius et al., 1997), sorting into unique batteries items
that tap: 1.a) symbolic patriotism, i.e., feeling pride in and love for America’s symbols,
such as the flag and anthem; and those that tap, 1.b) national identity, i.e., feeling as
though one is a member of the nation, as a social group.
A separate intellectual tradition focuses on the notion of American exceptionalism,
which at a minimum (and stripped of all normative content) denotes the idea that the
U.S.—due to its (former) geographic, economic, and political isolation—is ‘evolutionarily’
unique from other countries (Kingdon, 1999);6 many scholars, in turn, have investigated
the accuracy of this claim (e.g., Lipset, 1997; Shafer, 1991, 1999; Wilson, 1998; Koh,
2002). Yet, as Ceaser (2012) argues, the focus on “America [as] a statistical outlier” is
somewhat academic, as it neglects the actual way in which historical and contemporary
actors have imbued the term with normative overtones: the U.S. is not merely ‘atypical,’
5 Perhaps less productive is the distinction Schatz et al. (1999) make between: 1) blind patriotism,
i.e., an unwillingness to criticize, and to accept criticism of, the nation; and 2) constructive patriotism,
i.e., a “critical loyalty” for one’s nation, expressed via a desire for positive change. The problem, as
Huddy and Khatib (2007, p.64) argue, is that blind patriotism correlates too greatly with nationalism,
ethnocentrism, and conservative ideology, thereby “blurring the distinction between patriotism and na-
tionalism.” Similarly, constructive patriotism has a liberal-bent and is confounded by political interest.
6 As Wilson (1998, p.vi) writes, for this school of thought, “the question, it cannot be stressed too
strongly, is not whether the U.S. is ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than other nations but whether it is different.”
69
it is ‘special.’ According to Ceaser, this version of the term consists of two related,
but “distinct,” concepts: 1) America’s special character, i.e., the idea that the U.S.—
particularly its people, its culture, and its institutions—is superior to other nations;
and, 2) America’s special mission, i.e., the idea that, due to the special character of their
homeland, Americans are “a chosen people” tasked (perhaps by God) with redeeming
the world via the promotion of U.S.-style liberal democracy. This understanding of
exceptionalism mirrors Gallup’s 2010 treatment of the term, which it also partitions
into two ideas: 80% of Americans (73% of Democrats, 91% of Republicans) agreed
that the “United States has a unique character. . . that sets it apart from other nations
as the greatest in the world,” whereas 66% of Americans (61% of Democrats, 73% of
Republicans) subscribed to the notion that “the United States does. . . have a special
responsibility to be the leading nation in world affairs.”7
In viewing the U.S. as the outstanding, peerless nation, the specialness variant of
exceptionalism (in particular the character subpiece) has the ring of nationalism; after
all, each concept has at its core a belief in national superiority. However, as Virgin and
Engelhardt (nd) argue, the two are not perfect substitutes. First, exceptionalism does
not include the nationalist’s craving for foreign dominance, such as the U.S. winning
international sporting events and “be[ing] number one in whatever it does” (see Koster-
man and Feshbach, 1989, Table 2, p.265). Unlike the nationalist, it’s not a given that
the exceptionalist, for example, should have needed the U.S. to be the first to the Moon
during the space race.8 Second, nationalism does not include the exceptionalist’s belief
7 Jeffery Jones, “Americans See U.S. as Exceptional; 37% Doubt Obama Does,” USAToday/Gallup,
22 Dec. 2010, https://news.gallup.com/poll/145358/americans-exceptional-doubt-obama.aspx.
8 In that they use the word “dominate,” many nationalism items are quite direct. But even items
that eschew these terms nevertheless tend to strongly imply dominance by placing America in opposition
to other nations, which the U.S. must defeat “to maintain our country’s superiority” (e.g., Sidanius et al.,
1997, Table 1, p.108). The exceptionalism battery of Virgin and Engelhardt (nd), conversely, does not.
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Battery Item
Special character
1. The United States has a unique character that makes it the
greatest country in the world. (16 words)
2. When we teach American schoolchildren that the U.S. has the
best political system, we teach them the truth. (18 words)
3. Other countries should try to make their governments as much
like ours as possible. (14 words)
4. America’s way of doing things is no better than the way other
countries do things. (rev.; 15 words)
Special mission
1. The United States has a special responsibility to be the leading
nation in world affairs. (15 words)
2. The United States should use its position as a superpower to
promote democracy around the world. (16 words)
3. It is the destiny of Americans to lead the world in the creation
of a democratic order. (17 words)
4. The world would be a better place if the U.S. stopped trying to
remake foreign nations in its image. (rev.; 19 words)
Notes: Each battery utilized the following prompt: ‘Now, we will show several statements that people
sometimes make. Please respond to the statements with the response options provided. For each
statement, we would like you to tell us how strongly you disagree or agree.’ The survey randomized the
order of the batteries, as well as the order of the items within each battery. The survey boldfaced the
negative in each reversed item.
Table 4.1: Question wordings for American exceptionalism
in a special mission. True, U.S. foreign policy may blur the distinction between foreign
assistance and domination, but whereas the nationalist participates on the international
stage in order to best other nations, the exceptionalist does so to help.9 In other words,
Americans are not necessarily ‘chosen’ to be winners, but rather to be the ambassadors
9 The question of whether or not the U.S. actually helps foreign nations via its various interventions—
as well as whether Western liberal democracy is one-size-fits-all—is outside the scope of this project.
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of liberal democracy. “[The] mission is undertaken,” Ceaser (2012, p.9) writes, “not for
enjoyment or profit but as a responsibility in fulfilling a larger purpose.” Enjoyment and
profit (at the expense of other nations), conversely, are the domain of the nationalist.
4.2.2 Mapping exceptionalism onto electoral reform
Attitudinally, an exceptionalist is an individual who believes the U.S. and its people:
1) are comparatively superior; and, 2) have been called upon to aid foreign nations, by
‘Americanizing’ their political institutions and values.
How, then, might this attitude relate to the issue of electoral rule choice? Following
Renwick (2010, p.62), I argue that in countries characterized by institutional stability
over a long period, the institution itself (in this case, the electoral system) “comes to
be seen as embodying aspects of the national character.” As such, the status quo is not
merely the current way of doing things, but rather the ‘American way’—citizens and
elites become “accustomed to [our ] arrangements” (Kingdon, 1999, p.54). If so, then any
electoral reform—especially those alternatives the U.S. might borrow from abroad—risks
diluting the distinctive national character of the system. Because the exceptionalist not
only believes that the U.S. is superior but also that the adoption of its way of doing
things would benefit foreigners, she should be especially prone to finding the electoral
status quo (alternative) to be satisfactory (unsatisfactory), if not in absolute terms, then
at least relative to all foreign imports (the domestic status quo). Or, put in the language
of policy diffusion, she should have neither the desire to “imitate” the electoral rules of
other countries nor the willingness to “learn” from their experiences (Shipan and Volden,
2008). As such, she should be particularly likely to oppose reform.
Mechanistically, there may be a number of pathways at work. Scholars in consumer
psychology who study the so-called ‘country-of-origin’ (i.e., the country in which a prod-
uct is produced or with which it is culturally or economically associated; henceforth,
72
CoO) effect have found that consumers utilize ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ cues in prod-
uct evaluation and purchase decision-making (Shimp and Sharma, 1987). Verlegh and
Steenkamp (1999, p.524–28), building on Obermiller and Spangenberg (1989), argue that
such evaluations occur in three distinct, but often intertwined, ways of information pro-
cessing. First, via cognitive processing, a consumer uses the CoO and attendant cultural
stereotypes to infer product quality, such as reliability or superior craftsmanship (e.g.,
she evaluates a German-made car as being of a high quality, because German engineers
are perceived as being competent). Second, via affective processing, the consumer uses
the symbolism of the CoO to derive emotional benefits, such as high socioeconomic status
or national pride (e.g., a German-made car confers upon its owner a sense of luxury or,
for the German purchaser, of national pride). Third, via normative processing, the CoO
draws in the consumer either because she believes the originating country does things
‘the right way’ or that it is ‘correct’ to support that country (e.g., an American consumer
may avoid a German-made car because it is wrong to harm the domestic industry.)
In Table 4.2, I apply the logic of country-of-origin effects to electoral rule ‘consump-
tion,’ with the status quo representing the ‘domestic product’ and the reform alternative
the ‘foreign import.’ Drawn to the U.S.’s CoO, the exceptionalist’s defense of the status
quo electoral rule might be based on her perception that the U.S. system: 1) has reliably
delivered success and worked well (cognitive); 2) is a symbol of the Founders’ intent or
American ingenuity, which stirs her emotions (affective); and/or, 3) has the “patina of
rightness” (Renwick, 2010, p.62), due to its domestic association, and that “tamper[ing]
with it” is wrong (normative). The same logic can apply to the foreign reform alternative,
which the exceptionalist might: 1) view as being of inferior quality; 2) find emotionally
less gratifying; and/or, 3) perceive as the ‘wrong way’ of doing things. Whatever the
mechanism, the national character of the U.S. electoral system means that, for the ex-
ceptionalist, there is a bankruptcy in policy proposals that would force America to forfeit
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Focal ‘product’ (i.e., electoral rule)
(1) Domestic status quo (2) Foreign alternative
C
oO
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
(A) Cognitive processing View SQ as proven,reliable, of superior quality
View alternative as risky,
unreliable, of inferior
quality
(B) Affective processing
Obtain emotional benefits
from SQ’s symbolism, (e.g.,
status or national pride)
Alternative does not
provide emotional benefits
(C) Normative processing
View domestic norm as the
‘right way’ to do things or
as necessary to support
View alternative as the
‘wrong way’ (or at least as
normatively less desirable)
Notes: Framework for country-of-origin (CoO) effect mechanisms from Verlegh and Steenkamp (1999).
Table 4.2: Mechanisms through which the country-of-origin effect operates
that which makes it special and to regress towards the comparative mean.10
4.2.3 Hypotheses
Based on the above discussion, I develop the following three interrelated, preregistered11
hypotheses about the relationship between American exceptionalism, as an attitude,
and support for electoral reform. H1 assesses the bivariate association between these
two variables, whereas H2.a and H2.b tests the causal relationship between the two, by
10 If the U.S.’s way of doing things is the best, then why not ‘help others’ by encouraging the adoption
of American institutions and values elsewhere? Indeed, a second implication of the above theory (albeit
one not explored here) is that the exceptionalist, in addition to being opposed to the importation of
foreign electoral rules, might also be pro-exportation, i.e., she should have the urge to teach foreign
governments and peoples the benefits of U.S.-style democracy and to encourage (or compel) the former’s
imitation of the ‘American way.’ This clearly relates to the special mission subpiece of exceptionalism.
11 Preregistered content, hosted by the Center for Open Science, is available at https://osf.io/g75hq.
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interacting exceptionalism with treatment assignment:
◦ H1: As the strength of the exceptionalist attitude increases, support for electoral
reform will decline—i.e., exceptionalists should be more likely to oppose the reform
than non-exceptionalists.
◦ H2.a: The framing of the focal electoral rule as “foreign,” “imported,” and “un-
American” will, all else equal, cause treated exceptionalists to be less supportive
of the reform relative to untreated exceptionalists.
◦ H2.b: The framing of the focal electoral rule as “foreign,” “imported,” and “un-
American” will not, all else equal, affect non-exceptionalists—i.e., treatment as-
signment will have no effect on support.
4.3 Research design
The objective of this study is to isolate the effect of American exceptionalism on support
for electoral reform in the U.S.; after having established the independent effect of this at-
titude, I will in my future work countervail exceptionalism against partisan self-interest,
a la Chapter 3, in order to explore the interactive effect. To evaluate this relationship, I
have developed and preregistered a within-cohort, between-subjects experimental design
that manipulates the framing of a given electoral reform policy, holding all else constant.
Respondents are randomly assigned into one of two conditions: a control, which contains
no frame; and a treatment, which portrays the electoral reform proposal as “foreign” and
“un-American” and thus is intended to prime exceptionalist attitudes. These conditions
are best understood as the absence and presence of country-of-origin (CoO) labels, re-
spectively. A subject’s treatment assignment does not depend on her profile (i.e., either
condition is available to any respondent), and in the analysis, I compare treated and un-
treated exceptionalists (non-exceptionalists) to obtain cohort treatment effects. I deploy
this design for two separate experiments, which differ from each other in their focal rule,
only ; respondents are randomly assigned into either Experiment 1 or 2.
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4.3.1 Instrument
The instrument is a vignette, written by the investigator to appear as a policy brief;
each vignette contains two parts. First, each vignette contains content about the focal
reform and the changes it would make to the status quo electoral rule. It is here that
Experiment 1 and 2 differ. The former discusses the “Fair Representation Act” (FRA),
a reform proposal currently before Congress that would convert U.S. House elections
from American-style, winner-take-all single-member plurality (SMP) to a multi-winner
ranked-choice system most akin to Irish-style single-transferable vote (STV). To increase
external validity, I have modeled the FRA vignettes after a press release from the office
of Rep. Don Beyer, the bill’s sponsor.12 These vignettes read:
As you may know, each American citizen resides within a single-seat district
and has just one representative to the U.S. House. We therefore call such a
district ‘winner-take-all.’
However, some people have suggested changing the way we conduct our con-
gressional elections. One idea out there is the “Fair Representation Act.”
This bill would convert U.S. House districts into multi-winner districts, each
with five seats. District voters, then, would fill these seats via ranked-choice
voting. A ranked-choice ballot allows a voter to rank the district candidates in
order of her preference: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and so on. The five district candidates
with the ‘strongest’ overall preferential support would win seats . . .
Experiment 2, on the other hand, discusses the “Equal Vote Amendment” (EVA, so-
named by the investigator), a reform proposal that would amend the U.S. Constitution
12 “Beyer Introduces Fair Representation Act to Reform Congressional Elections,” Office of Rep.
Don Beyer, 26 June 2017, https://beyer.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=616. In
addition, I also consulted two related articles: “Fair Representation Act Would Be ’The Most
Comprehensive Approach to Changing How We Elect Congress In American History’,” Medium,
26 Dec. 2017, https://govtrackinsider.com/fair-representation-act-would-be-the-most-comprehensive-
approach-to-changing-how-we-elect-congress-c3505fa6a937; and, Drew Penrose, “Voting Reform Goes
from Theory to Legislation,” The American Prospect, 5 Nov. 2018, https://prospect.org/article/voting-
reform-goes-theory-legislation.
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Focal electoral reform
(1) Fair Representation Act (2) Equal Vote Amendment
Fr
am
e (A) None Control (155 words) Control (157 words)
(B) Foreign Treatment (178 words) Treatment (180 words)
Notes: Respondents are randomly assigned into either Experiment 1 (column 1) or Experiment 2 (column
2) and, then, within each, into either the control condition (row A) or the treatment (row B).
Table 4.3: Treatment and control groups for the two experiments
to eliminate the Electoral College and replace it with a two-round, direct vote system
most similar to French-style presidential elections (2RR). To increase external validity,
I have modeled the EVA vignettes after the description in Longley and Braun (1972,
p.82–3) of former-Sen. Birch Bayh’s “Direct Vote Plan.”13 These vignettes read:
As you may know, Americans elect their president via the Electoral College,
in which each state has a set number of electoral votes.
However, some people have suggested changing the way we conduct our pres-
idential elections. One idea out there is the “Equal Vote Amendment” to the
Constitution.
This bill would replace the Electoral College with a two-round system based
on the national popular vote. The candidate with the most popular votes
would be elected president, provided he or she got at least 40% of the vote.
If no one got 40%, then the two strongest candidates, only, would compete
in a second round ‘runoff’ election, with the most votes winning . . .
13 Current bills before Congress that would eliminate the College (for example, Rep. Steve Cohen’s;
see: Jamie Ehrlich, “Congressman Proposes Eliminating Electoral College, Preventing Presidents from
Pardoning Themselves,” CNN, 5 Jan. 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/04/politics/constitutional-
amendments-steve-cohen-electoral-pardon/index.html) merely would replace the College with a single-
round, pluralitarian, direct election. Without a French-style second round, such reforms are not as
obviously ‘foreign’ in their conception as Bayh’s 1970s two-round proposal. This is because the U.S.
utilizes direct, single-round, pluralitarian elections for all legislative contests.
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As can be seen above, both the FRA and EVA descriptions, where possible, use lay
rather than technical terms; each also carefully eschews overly partisan content. (For a
more technical treatment of STV and 2RR, see Farrell, 2011, ch.6 and 3, respectively.)
Second, each vignette contains editorial language about the focal reform (either FRA
or EVA) and its anticipated effects. It is here that Experiment 1 and 2 share content.14
Moreover, it is in the editorial language that a treated respondent receives the frame—to
prime exceptionalism, the treatment utilizes triggering phrases “foreign import,” “Europe
and elsewhere,” and “out-of-place in America” to castigate the reform proposal. It reads:
. . . Although this electoral system would be new to the U.S., many foreign
countries—in Europe and elsewhere—currently use it.
Some people argue that, taken together, these changes would incentivize can-
didates to appeal to a broader range of voters and would better reflect the
people’s will.
Other people counter that the proposed changes are too dramatic; and more-
over, that such a ‘foreign import’ would be out-of-place in America.
Conversely, the control condition excises from its editorial language all exceptionalism-
priming content. It reads:
. . . This electoral system would be new to the U.S.
Some people argue that, taken together, these changes would incentivize can-
didates to appeal to a broader range of voters and would better reflect the
people’s will.
Other people counter that the proposed changes are too dramatic.
Importantly, both the FRA and EVA can be described accurately as ‘foreign’ or ‘im-
ported’ or ‘un-American,’ because neither has a history of usage in the U.S. and each
is utilized abroad, for example by Ireland and France, respectively. Table 4.3 visually
displays the experimental set-up, and provides a word count for each of the four vignettes.
14 The only difference is a minor one: Experiment 1 (2) refers to “congressional candidates” (“presi-
dential candidates”), since it is about the FRA (EVA).
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4.3.2 Analysis
The theory, however, is not about which vignette a subject receives, but rather how that
treatment primes her attitudes about American exceptionalism. Again, based on the
literature, I conceptualize exceptionalism as consisting of two related, but distinct, ideas:
1) the U.S.’s ‘special character’; and, 2) its ‘special mission.’ To obtain information on a
respondent’s attitude toward each, I ask a four-item battery for ‘special character’ and
a four-item battery for ‘special mission,’ pre-stimulus. (I developed these batteries, with
a colleague, using an online convenience sample from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk plat-
form; see Virgin and Engelhardt, nd, for the results of the exploratory factor analysis.)
Table 4.1 contains the text of all eight questions; each item presented respondents with
five options from which to choose, ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree.’
To minimize response acquiescence, each battery contains one reverse-worded item with
which, per theory, a strong exceptionalist should disagree. I opt for a ‘continuous’ oper-
ationalization of the variable (exceptionalism), in which a respondent receives a score of
4 (0) every time she selects the theorized ‘strong exceptionalist’ (‘weak exceptionalist’)
position. Adding together these scores yields a scale of 32 (4 × 8) when using all eight
items, and 24 (4× 6) when excluding the reversed worded items from the analysis.
Although exceptionalism is the key theoretical explanatory variable, in the interactive
models that follows it takes on the role of moderator. The dependent variable (support) is
support for the focal electoral reform, polled post-stimulus; this variable is measured via a
5-point Likert scale, from ‘strongly oppose’ to ‘strongly support’ (0–4). The independent
variable (treatment) for all studies is randomized treatment assignment; subjects who
receive the treatment are coded 1, whereas those in the control are 0. For all models, I
utilize Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Model 1 is a simple bivariate regression between
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explanatory and outcome variable:
support = β0 + β1exceptionalism (4.1)
To explore the causal relationship between the two, Model 2 interacts exceptionalism
with treatment assignment:
support = β0 + β1treatment+ β2exceptionalism+ β3
(
treatment× exceptionalism
)
(4.2)
The marginal effect of treatment on support conditional on exceptionalism, then, is cal-
culated as follows:
∂support
∂treatment
= β1 + β3
(
exceptionalism
)
(4.3)
Where β1 is the direct effect of the triggering frames on support for reform and β3 is the
coefficient on the interaction term.
4.4 Study
I utilize this design for two separate experiments, each of which required respondents to
answer every question and prohibited them from advancing the vignette until at least 20
seconds had elapsed. A respondent was randomly sorted into one experiment.
4.4.1 Recruitment and data
For the study, fielded on 10 June 2019, I recruited 1022 subjects from Amazon’s Mechan-
ical Turk Internet-based crowd-sourcing platform. Workers selected voluntarily into the
study after viewing an advertisement posted on the MTurk website; they had a maximum
of one hour to complete the task and were compensated $1.25 for their time. The survey
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screened out subjects younger than 18-years old and subjects located outside the U.S.15
A convenience sample, the MTurk draw is, as expected, not nationally-representative. In
this case, it skews Democratic (54.31%), young (54.21% between 18–34-years old), edu-
cated (57.34% with a Bachelor’s degree or higher), and male (54.50%).16 With respect to
the values positions of respondents, Table 4.4 displays descriptive statistics for the dis-
tributions of special character, special mission, and full exceptionalist attitudes. I have
dropped the reversed worded item from both the special character and special mission
batteries (see Table 4.1), because the data show that each reversed item scales poorly
with its respective three battery-mates. In the Appendix, I rerun the following analyses
using all eight exceptionalism questions, as opposed to just the six forward worded ones.
4.4.2 Results
I begin by running a simple bivariate OLS model of the relationship between excep-
tionalist attitudes and support for the focal electoral reform, irregardless of treatment
assignment. Figure 4.1 displays the association for Experiment 1 (FRA) whereas Figure
4.2 displays the result for Experiment 2 (EVA); each is presented as a predicted proba-
bility for the outcome variable on the y-axis, with the strength of exceptionalism on the
x-axis and increasing from left to right. As hypothesized in H1, the relationship between
the two variables is negative: as we move from non-exceptionalists to exceptionalists, the
predicted probability of supporting the focal electoral reform attenuates, more or less,
to zero. While this is promising, initial evidence in support of the theory, it is nonethe-
less not evidence of a causal relationship, as exceptionalist sentiments are not randomly
assigned throughout the mass public.
15 The survey set worker qualifications to ensure high performance. The qualifications are approval
HIT rate ≥ 90% and number of HITS approved ≥ 100. A third qualification prohibited workers from
my previous MTurk-hosted surveys about election rules and reform from participating in the study.
16 On MTurk’s weaknesses, see Berinsky et al. (2012); Buhrmester et al. (2011); Anson (2018).
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Battery Condition Experiment 1 (FRA) Experiment 2 (EVA)
n Mean Range n Mean Range
Special character
Control 258 6.88 0–12 256 6.29 0–12
Treatment 251 5.78 0–12 257 6.49 0–12
Combined 509 6.34 0–12 513 6.39 0–12
Special mission
Control 258 6.62 0–12 256 6.63 0–12
Treatment 251 6.34 0–12 257 6.81 0–12
Combined 509 6.48 0–12 513 6.72 0–12
Exceptionalism
Control 258 13.51 0–24 256 12.93 0–24
Treatment 251 12.12 0–24 257 13.30 0–24
Combined 509 12.82 0–24 513 13.11 0–24
Notes: The scale for each sub-piece of exceptionalism is 0 to 12 points, whereas the full scale for
exceptionalism is 0–24.
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics for exceptionalism, by experiment and condition
To investigate the causal relationship, i.e., that an increase in exceptionalist attitudes
leads to a decrease in support for electoral reform in the U.S., I interact exceptionalism
with treatment assignment—because the triggering frames of the randomized treatment
should have primed individuals in that group to think in terms of the imported nature
of the focal alternative, we can have confidence that any underlying confounder is held
constant between treatment and control. Hypothesis H2.a (H2.b), then, compares primed
and unprimed exceptionalists (non-exceptionalists), predicting that the latter will be
more likely to oppose the reform (no difference, due to a lack of frame receptivity). Figure
4.3 displays the interactive relationship between the three variables for Experiment 1 and
Figure 4.4 does the same for Experiment 2; each colors the control group in blue and the
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Figure 4.1: Bivariate relationship between exceptionalism and FRA support
treatment group in red. As before, the y-axis is the predicted probability of support.
Neither hypothesis is supported, as both the effects of treatment and control attenuate,
as exceptionalism increases, at the same rate. In contrast, H2.a predicts that only the
treatment group should decline, and H2.b expects a, more or less, straight line for the
control group. In the subsequent Discussion, I argue that the failure of the interactive
hypothesis could be due to the survey design having inadvertently ‘treated’ the control
group. Notwithstanding the statistical indistinguishability between the two groups, a few
aspects of the result are worth noting. First, and especially for the EVA, the triggering
frames do appear to pull the exceptionalists in the treatment group farther downward
relative to their counterparts in the control—i.e., its slope is more dramatic, evidence
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Figure 4.2: Bivariate relationship between exceptionalism and EVA support
that is consistent with H2.a. Second, and in contrast to H2.b’s prediction of no effect, the
triggering frames appear to actually increase the likelihood that non-exceptionalists will
support the focal reform, as non-exceptionalists in the treatment group appear above
their control group counterparts. Interestingly, this is early evidence that points to a
reverse effect: triggering phrases may affect non-exceptionalists, too, albeit in a positive
direction. Framing the focal alternative as a “foreign import” that is “un-American” and
“European,” then, might actually appeal to these individuals.
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Figure 4.3: Relationship between exceptionalism and FRA support, by treatment
4.4.3 Discussion
The results of this study are therefore muddled. Notably, there is indeed a substantively
interesting association between a belief in American exceptionalism and a willingness to
support electoral reform in the U.S. (at least across the two focal rule changes explored
here); as hypothesized, this relationship is negative (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). However, I
did not find support for the multiplicative model that interacts exceptionalist attitudes
with treatment assignment, as there was no difference on the outcome variable between
respondents who were treated and those who were assigned to the control group (Figures
4.3 and 4.4). Because the random triggering of exceptionalist sentiments (via frames that
highlighted the focal alternative’s foreignness) was necessary to provide this relationship
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Figure 4.4: Relationship between exceptionalism and EVA support, by treatment
with causal heft, the failure of the interactive model means that it would be inappropriate
to conclude that exceptionalism necessarily led to the result on support for electoral
reform. At this stage, it is an association and nothing more.
I suspect that the reason I could not recover a difference between the treatment
and control groups is because the survey design accidentally ‘treated’ subjects for whom
no treatment was intended—i.e., if a contaminant got to the control, then individuals
in each condition, rather than the treatment only, could have been primed to think
about the U.S. and the ‘American way’ when reading their vignette and answering the
outcome variable. Two suspects emerge. The first is a question ordering effect. Prior
to random assignment, the survey asked all respondents to answer 15 questions related
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to national affect: four for the special character battery, four for special mission, and
four and three, respectively, for the related concepts of national identity and symbolic
patriotism. Although the survey randomized the order of the national affect batteries
and separated them with other questions, it was—in retrospect—nonetheless a survey
that kept returning the respondent again and again to items affect-related on the U.S.17
Compounding the issue further, with just two (short) diversion items18 to separate the
final national affect battery from the vignette on electoral reform, there was perhaps as
little as 15 seconds for any inadvertent, pre-stimulus priming of national affect to decay
before the survey randomly sorted subjects into conditions.
The second suspect, though admittedly a less likely culprit, is that both the control
and treatment vignettes contained the phrase: “This electoral system would be new to the
U.S.” While relatively weak compared to the frames that the treatment deployed (e.g.,
“foreign import,” “un-American,” and “in Europe and elsewhere”) a remark about the
17 In the survey, the national identity and symbolic patriotism batteries were always paired in one
block, albeit randomized as to which battery presented first. These seven questions, then, were always
followed by the same five randomized items: three political knowledge questions and two questions
about U.S. institutions—1) ‘To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of
the United States?’; and, 2) ‘To what extent do you trust elections in this country?’ In hindsight,
the latter two items were too germane to the issue at hand, and indeed subjects may have recalled
(and sought to honor) their answers to these two pre-stimulus items when answering the post-stimulus
outcome variable. The survey also always paired into a second block the special character and special
mission batteries, with the same randomizing procedure described above. These eight exceptionalism
questions were always followed by the same four randomized items: two questions on political knowledge
and two on political interest. Finally, a third block with demographic questions (including partisan and
ideological identifications) randomized with the two blocks detailed above.
18 These two diversion items were not randomized in the survey flow, i.e., every respondent received
these two items just before heading into the vignette. For documentation purposes, these items were as
follows: 1) ‘I like to contribute to the arts, such as by going to the symphony or art museum,’ followed
by a 5-point agree-disagree Likert scale; and, 2) ‘The number three is less than the number five,’ i.e., a
true or false compliance check.
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alternative’s novelty in the U.S. is arguably an exceptionalism-triggering phrase, because
newness to the U.S. can imply a foreign origin.19 If so, then the newness bit could have
primed control subjects to consider national affect when I did not intend them to.
A second study with this instrument slightly modified could easily address these two
potential contaminants, by excising superfluous national affect items (i.e., the national
identity and symbolic patriotism batteries) that are not needed for the analysis, as well as
by removing from the control group (but retaining in the treatment) the ‘new to the U.S.’
trigger. Additionally, increasing the survey distance between the exceptionalism batteries
and the electoral reform vignettes would be advisable, and a larger, omnibus survey could
easily accomplish this. Taken together, these three recommended changes should combine
to minimize any accidental priming of national affect within the control group, all while
making no obvious threat the to external validity of the experiments. If in this second
study the data again did not support the interactive hypotheses, then the instrument’s
failure under (more) auspicious circumstances could warrant its abandonment.
4.5 Conclusion
Since the 2016 elections, the topic of electoral reform in America has gained renewed
salience, and rule changes at the congressional, presidential, and subnational levels have
piqued the interest of lawmakers, activists, journalists, and even a subset of the electorate.
Although some of the rule changes under discussion are domestic originals decidedly
unique to the U.S. (e.g., the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact; see 2), other
potential rule changes have a tradition of development and usage abroad. In these cases,
the policy legacies and experiences of the originating foreign democracy may become part
19 When constructing the vignettes, I reasoned that “new to the U.S.” could also be consistent with
a domestic subnational rule suddenly being applied to the federal level, as well as a newly-invented rule
that had never been used anywhere in the world. But, each of these would seem to be a less obvious
place for the respondent’s mind to go than concluding that ‘new’ indicated a foreign import.
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of the U.S.’s reform debate, provided domestic elites seize upon and deploy this narrative
when attempting to influence public opinion (or, as in the Bangor Public Library example
that began this paper, when teaching people how a new system would work). Because the
intensity of attachment to the nation (i.e., America and the ‘American way’) is not evenly
distributed among Americans, a message that references the ‘foreign import’ nature of
a given alternative is liable to differentially affect members of the population—some
individuals, seeing the American way as sacrosanct and superior, might be particularly
ill-disposed to forfeiting American distinctiveness to model democracies abroad. Such
individuals should score highly on measures of national affect.
In this paper, I have investigated the effect on support for electoral reform of one
such type of national affect: the attitude of American exceptionalism, defined here as
the belief in the U.S.’s comparative superiority (i.e., its “special character”), as well as
the attendant desire to help foreign peoples to adopt American-style liberal values and
political institutions (i.e., its “special mission) (Ceaser, 2012). In doing so, I join other
scholars (Renwick, 2010, 2011; Leyenaar and Hazan, 2011; Bowler et al., 2006; Bowler and
Donovan, 2013; Virgin, 2017, nd) in attempting to move beyond partisan self-interest—
that is, the canonical explanation for electoral reform—to sketch a more nuanced picture
of the motivational reasons for why reform may or may not occur. Using a between-
subjects framing experiment that randomly assigns respondents into either a treatment
group that features exceptionalism-triggering phrases (such as “un-American,” “foreign
import,” and “used in Europe”) or a sans-frames control group, I find initial evidence of
the hypothesized negative association between exceptionalist sentiments and support for
electoral reform. However, due to some issues with the instrument and survey design
(i.e., a question order effect), this paper cannot speak to causality.
The current project provides numerous opportunities for future research. Most ob-
viously, and as mentioned in the above Discussion, a second study is needed to identify
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a causal connection between exceptionalism and support for electoral reform; this study
should use, more or less, the same instrument but attend to and correct the possible
question order/context mistakes of the design deployed here. A second avenue for explo-
ration is to pursue other electoral reform alternatives than the two here explored (FRA
and EVA), i.e., the topic of the reform proposal, as well as its attendant origin. On the
one hand, FRA and EVA are reforms that are quite topical, because they address con-
gressional and presidential elections, respectively. Yet, on the other, these two reforms
are each what Jacobs and Leyenaar (2011) term “major” (i.e., systemic changes) rather
than “minor” electoral reforms. Moreover, each is European in its origin—and Ireland
and France are two historically white countries. It would therefore be informative to
vary the ethnic/racial identity of the originating foreign country, since often feelings of
national affect (in particular, the feeling of comparative superiority associated with na-
tionalism and exceptionalism) can be intertwined with the psychology of racial prejudice
(Ceaser, 2012; de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003).
Third, a second implication of the theory, albeit not explored in this paper, is that
exceptionalists should be more likely than non-exceptionalists to favor the exportation
of U.S. electoral institutions abroad, consistent with the belief in a special mission. Ex-
ploration of the ‘other direction’ of policy diffusion will be important to filling out the
import/export nature of the theory, and would compliment the ‘buy-American’ ethno-
consumerism of Shimp and Sharma (1987). Finally, and once the effect of exceptionalism
on reform is established, it will be necessary to countervail it against canonical parti-
san self-interest, a la Chapter 3. My hope is that this paper, as well as the extensions
noted above, will contribute to the discipline by bringing national affect into our discus-
sions of electoral reform, thereby sketching a more complete picture of the motivational
underpinnings of rule choice.
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Chapter 5
Appendices
5.1 Chapter 2 Appendix
5.1.1 NVPIC progress variable
The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) is a subnational reform pro-
posal to the U.S. electoral college that has been introduced in all 51 state legislatures.
(Because the proposal utilizes state powers it thus lies within the jurisdiction of each
state legislature and executive.) I collected data on each instance of NPVIC introduc-
tion from 2006–14, in particular bill progress summaries. Using this information, I next
coded each NPVIC bill on how far in the legislative process it advanced; the ordinal
scale ranges from “0” (i.e., no bill introduced) to “6” (i.e., public law). The conversion
of bill summaries from 51 unique subnational units into a uniform, 7-point ordinal scale,
however, requires the construction of a stylized legislative process (see Figure 5.1), which
I generated via six simplifying assumptions (A1–A6).
◦ A1) Branch u includes cases in which a bill is introduced in the originating cham-
ber, and: 1) is sent to committee, where is subsequently dies; 2) is never assigned
to a committee. In both cases, the distance progressed is the same: it does not
make it beyond Committee A.
◦ A2) Branch v includes cases in which a bill passes the originating chamber com-
mittee and proceeds to the full chamber, but: 1) fails on the floor vote; 2) never
receives a floor vote. In both cases, the distance progressed is the same: it passes
Committee A but not Chamber A.
◦ A3) Branch w includes cases in which a bill passes the originating chamber, but: 1)
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NPVIC introduced?
Yes
Passes committee A?
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Passes chamber A?
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Passes committee B?
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Passes chamber B?
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t
Figure 5.1: NPVIC progress decision tree
is not forwarded to the receiving chamber; 2) is not assigned to a receiving chamber
committee; 3) is assigned to a committee, wherein it subsequently dies. In all three
cases, the distance progressed is the same: it passes Chamber A but fails to make
it past Committee B.
◦ A4) Branch x includes cases in which a bill passes the receiving chamber committee,
but: 1) fails on the floor vote; 2) never receives a floor vote. In both cases, the
distance progressed is the same: it passes Committee B but does not make it
beyond Chamber B.
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◦ A5) Branch y includes cases in which a bill passes both chambers, but: 1) is vetoed
by the governor and the legislature does not attempt an override; 2) is vetoed
by the governor and the legislature’s override fails; 3) requires—due to receiving
chamber amendments—conference committee, in which it dies; 4) requires and
passes conference committee, is vetoed by the governor, and the legislature does
not attempt an override; 5) requires and passes conference committee, is vetoed
by the governor, and the legislature’s override fails. In all five cases, the distance
progressed is the same: it passes both chambers but fails to become law.
◦ A6) Branch z includes cases in which a bill passes both chambers, and: 1) is signed
into law by the governor; 2) is vetoed by the governor but saved by the legislature’s
override; 3) is signed into law by the governor following successful passage through
conference committee; 4) is vetoed by the governor following successful passage
through conference committee, but is saved by the legislature’s override. In all four
cases, the distance progressed is the same: it becomes law and the state joins the
compact.
Together, A1–A6 generate a 7-point ordinal scale, dubbed npvicprog and represented in
Table 2.2:
◦ (code = 0) The bill is not introduced (tree node = t)
◦ (1) The bill is introduced but passes 0 committees and 0 chambers (u)
◦ (2) The bill passes 1 committee and 0 chambers (v)
◦ (3) The bill passes 1 committee and 1 chamber (w)
◦ (4) The bill passes 2 committees and 1 chamber (x)
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◦ (5) The bill passes 2 committees and 2 chambers but does not become state law
(y)
◦ (6) The bill passes 2 committees and 2 chambers and becomes state law (z)
With some states, however, coding NPVIC progress is anything but straightforward,
due primarily to legislature-specific, institutional peculiarities that do not map flawlessly
onto the ordinal scale. With state-level characteristics central to the conditional hypoth-
esis I seek to test, my preference is to preserve states in, rather than omit states from, the
dataset when possible. The trade-off, however, is that fitting these cases to the NPVIC
progress scale introduces to the variable a degree of subjectivity. As a result, I believe
it is beneficial to highlight the institutional variety I confronted, as well as my coding
decisions. In settling on a value for these (rare) cases, I have sought to avoid rewarding
states for bill progress not attributable directly to legislator support.
First, two states—Nebraska and the District of Columbia—are unicameral. Lacking
a second chamber, these observations cannot obtain values of 4 or 5. I have opted to omit
both states from the analysis.1 Second, some states refer NPVIC bills to joint committees,
on which both senators and representatives sit, rather than to a traditionally subdivided
system. In my coding, a bill that passes the originating chamber but not the receiving
chamber, scores a 4, under the (perhaps generous) assumption that joint committee
support indicates that, had the receiving chamber organized its own committee, it would
have reported the bill favorably to its floor.2 Third, some states refer NPVIC bills
1 Collapsing unicameral legislatures onto an ordinal scale designed for bicameralism requires the
voting behavior of committees and full chambers be independent of the number of houses. If, for
example, a committee in the originating chamber of a bicameral legislature counts on the receiving
chamber to kill a bad bill and is thus less discriminating than its unicameral counterpart, then it may
be easier to get legislation through one system as opposed to the other.
2 Because some of these states do not report committee votes, determining the proportion of commit-
tee support due to senators and the proportion due to representatives is not possible. Regardless, such
94
to multiple committees in a reference chain. To reach the floor, a bill must pass all
committees in the chain. In my coding, a bill that passes at least one, but not all,
committees in the series scores a 1, because it dies at some point at the committee
stage.3
Fourth, some states allow bills that do not receive favorable committee reports to
advance nonetheless to the full chamber. As a result, a lack of committee support is not
sufficient to kill the bill. In my coding, if the non-committee supported bill also dies on
the floor, the coding is 1 rather than 2, because the bill did not pass the decision rule
in committee. If the non-committee supported bill passed on the floor, the coding is 3.4
Fifth, in two states, a bill passed by both chambers of the legislature is not transmitted
automatically to the governor. Rather, the House and Senate must vote to enact (i.e.,
information would be of little use if lawmakers behave differently on joint as opposed to single-chamber
committees. If, for example, a representative votes strategically (e.g., to be accommodating, to log-roll,
to retaliate against the other chamber, etc.) when on a committee shared with senators but sincerely
when on a committee of representatives only, then her behavior would depend on the committee type.
3 Treating as equivalent single committee and multiple committee references assumes that the actions
of committees are independent of their inclusion in a reference chain. If, for example, a committee early
in the sequence alters its behavior due to the presence of the others (e.g., sits on a bill due to a territorial
dispute, expects a committee later in the sequence to kill the bill, etc.), then NPVIC progress may depend
on the reference chain. Moreover, having to clear three committees as opposed to one is an appreciably
more difficult assignment for a bill.
4 In Maine and New Hampshire, committees are required to issue a divided report, with competing
majority and minority recommendations. The full chamber subsequently votes on which report, if any,
to take up; acceptance of an minority-issued “ought to pass” report thus allows the bill to continue in
the process over the opposition of a majority of the committee. Similarly, in North Dakota, all bills,
regardless of committee action, are placed on the calendar for final passage. The danger here is that
committee members in these states behave differently than those in other states. For example, suppose
a legislator who supports NPVIC but whose party leadership does not. Placed in a state like Maine, she
could conceivably vote against the bill in committee to mollify her party and still pursue her individual
goal of NPVIC passage, since she knows the bill can survive an unfavorable majority report. Placed in
another state, however, these two aims would be mutually exclusive.
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send to the governor) engrossed bills, thus introducing an additional procedural hurdle
into the legislative process. In my coding, an engrossed bill that is not enacted receives
a value of 5, because it passes both chambers but does not become state law.5 Sixth,
New York has a rule that allows stalled bills from the first year of the legislative term
to be reintroduced automatically for the second year of the term, but the bill restarts at
the beginning of the legislative process. In my coding, a reintroduced bill is counted as
a separate effort since its first year progress does not carry over into the second year.6
5 It is possible that the requirement of an enactment vote causes legislators to alter their voting
behavior. If, for example, the receiving chamber believes the originating chamber—though it voted to
engross the bill—will not vote to enact the bill, it may abandon the bill as hopeless.
6 Understandably, treating each session of a given bill as two separate legislative efforts requires that
its presumed reintroduction does not impinge upon its first-year progress. If, for example, a committee
abandons its first-year work on a bill to wait for year two, then the bill’s first-year progress is not
necessarily attributable to legislator support alone. However, failure to separate bills into ‘effort a’ and
‘effort b’ would artificially deflate New York’s number of observations relative to other states.
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5.2 Chapter 3 Appendix
5.2.1 Vignettes
Instructions :
On the next page, we will provide you with an excerpt from a news story.
Please read the news story carefully. After you finish, you will be asked a few
questions about what you have read.
Access vignette (single-factor, 166 words):
In many states, fewer and fewer voters are having to make the traditional
trip to vote at their polling station. Instead, they are choosing to mail in
an absentee vote before Election Day. \ Starting soon, however, absentee
voting could change. This is because the U.S. is considering a proposal that
would alter some of the technical details of this common electoral procedure.
\ If implemented, the proposal is—on balance—expected to make it easier to
vote absentee. \ As such, voter access advocates are lining up behind the pro-
posal: they have long believed the current system makes it too hard for well-
intentioned individuals to exercise their right to vote. \ “This proposal would
open up the electoral process,” says John Lange, a proponent of expanded
access. “Legitimizing our elections by making voting more convenient is con-
sistent with America’s larger commitment to equality and inclusion.” \ Advo-
cates of electoral integrity, however, have countered that the proposal would
make it too hard for election officials to guard against unlawful, fraudulent voting.
Integrity vignette (single-factor, 166 words):
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In many states, fewer and fewer voters are having to make the traditional
trip to vote at their polling station. Instead, they are choosing to mail in
an absentee vote before Election Day. \ Starting soon, however, absentee
voting could change. This is because the U.S. is considering a proposal that
would alter some of the technical details of this common electoral procedure.
\ If implemented, the proposal is—on balance—expected to make it easier to
guard against voter fraud. \ As such, electoral integrity advocates are lining
up behind the proposal: they have long believed the current system makes
it too easy for ill-intentioned individuals to cast an unlawful vote. \ “This
proposal would zip up the electoral process,” says John Lange, a proponent of
electoral integrity. “Legitimizing our elections by encouraging in-person voting
is consistent with America’s larger commitment to honesty and security.” \
Advocates of voter access, however, have countered that the proposal would
make it too hard for registered voters to exercise their right to vote.
Democratic vignette (single-factor, 155 words):
In many states, fewer and fewer voters are having to make the traditional trip
to vote at their polling station. Instead, they are choosing to mail in an absen-
tee vote before Election Day. \ Starting soon, however, absentee voting could
change. This is because the U.S. is considering a proposal that would alter
some of the technical details of this common electoral procedure. \ If imple-
mented, the proposal is—on balance—expected to advantage the Democratic
Party. \ Democrats, as a result, are on board: they have always suspected
that the current system makes it too hard for their supporters to vote. \
“This proposal would help us to advance our overall agenda,” says Democratic
strategist Todd Bennett. “Changing absentee voting means more Democratic
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officeholders, which means the ability to advance progressive causes across
the country.” \ Republican critics have countered that the proposal would
distort the vote by giving Democrats an unfair advantage. “This is a liberal
power grab.”
Republican vignette (single-factor, 155 words):
In many states, fewer and fewer voters are having to make the traditional
trip to vote at their polling station. Instead, they are choosing to mail in
an absentee vote before Election Day. \ Starting soon, however, absentee
voting could change. This is because the U.S. is considering a proposal that
would alter some of the technical details of this common electoral procedure.
\ If implemented, the proposal is—on balance—expected to advantage the
Republican Party. \ Republicans, as a result, are on board: they have always
suspected that the current system makes it too hard for their supporters to
vote. \ “This proposal would help us to advance our overall agenda,” says
Republican strategist Todd Bennett. “Changing absentee voting means more
Republican officeholders, which means the ability to advance conservative
causes across the country.” \ Democratic critics have countered that the
proposal would distort the vote by giving Republicans an unfair advantage.
“This is a conservative power grab.”
Access + Democratic vignette (double-factor, 268 words):
In many states, fewer and fewer voters are having to make the traditional
trip to vote at their polling station. Instead, they are choosing to mail in
an absentee vote before Election Day. \ Starting soon, however, absentee
voting could change. This is because the U.S. is considering a proposal that
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would alter some of the technical details of this common electoral proce-
dure. \ If implemented, the proposal is—on balance—expected to have two
effects. \ First, the proposal would make it easier to vote absentee. \ As
such, voter access advocates are lining up behind the proposal: they have
long believed the current system makes it too hard for well-intentioned indi-
viduals to exercise their right to vote. \ “This proposal would open up the
electoral process,” says John Lange, a proponent of expanded access. “Le-
gitimizing our elections by making voting more convenient is consistent with
America’s larger commitment to equality and inclusion.” \ Advocates of
electoral integrity, however, have countered that the proposal would make it
too hard for election officials to guard against unlawful, fraudulent voting. \
The second expected effect of the proposal is that it would advantage the
Democratic Party. \ Democrats, as a result, are on board: they have always
suspected that the current system makes it too hard for their supporters to
vote. \ “This proposal would help us to advance our overall agenda,” says
Democratic strategist Todd Bennett. “Changing absentee voting means more
Democratic officeholders, which means the ability to advance progressive
causes across the country.” \ Republican critics have countered that the
proposal would distort the vote by giving Democrats an unfair advantage.
“This is a liberal power grab.”
Integrity + Republican vignette (double-factor, 268 words):
In many states, fewer and fewer voters are having to make the traditional trip
to vote at their polling station. Instead, they are choosing to mail in an absen-
tee vote before Election Day. \ Starting soon, however, absentee voting could
change. This is because the U.S. is considering a proposal that would alter
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some of the technical details of this common electoral procedure. \ If imple-
mented, the proposal is—on balance—expected to have two effects. \ First,
the proposal would make it easier to guard against voter fraud. \ As such,
electoral integrity advocates are lining up behind the proposal: they have long
believed the current system makes it too easy for ill-intentioned individuals
to cast an unlawful vote. \ “This proposal would zip up the electoral pro-
cess,” says John Lange, a proponent of electoral integrity. “Legitimizing our
elections by encouraging in-person voting is consistent with America’s larger
commitment to honesty and security.” \ Advocates of voter access, however,
have countered that the proposal would make it too hard for registered voters
to exercise their right to vote. \ The second expected effect of the proposal is
that it would advantage the Republican Party. \ Republicans, as a result, are
on board: they have always suspected that the current system makes it too
hard for their supporters to vote. \ “This proposal would help us to advance
our overall agenda,” says Republican strategist Todd Bennett. “Changing ab-
sentee voting means more Republican officeholders, which means the ability
to advance conservative causes across the country.” \ Democratic critics have
countered that the proposal would distort the vote by giving Republicans an
unfair advantage. “This is a conservative power grab.”
Integrity + Democratic vignette (double-factor, 268 words):
In many states, fewer and fewer voters are having to make the traditional trip
to vote at their polling station. Instead, they are choosing to mail in an absen-
tee vote before Election Day. \ Starting soon, however, absentee voting could
change. This is because the U.S. is considering a proposal that would alter
some of the technical details of this common electoral procedure. \ If imple-
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mented, the proposal is—on balance—expected to have two effects. \ First,
the proposal would make it easier to guard against voter fraud. \ As such,
electoral integrity advocates are lining up behind the proposal: they have long
believed the current system makes it too easy for ill-intentioned individuals
to cast an unlawful vote. \ “This proposal would zip up the electoral pro-
cess,” says John Lange, a proponent of electoral integrity. “Legitimizing our
elections by encouraging in-person voting is consistent with America’s larger
commitment to honesty and security.” \ Advocates of voter access, however,
have countered that the proposal would make it too hard for registered voters
to exercise their right to vote. \ The second expected effect of the proposal is
that it would advantage the Democratic Party. \ Democrats, as a result, are
on board: they have always suspected that the current system makes it too
hard for their supporters to vote. \ “This proposal would help us to advance
our overall agenda,” says Democratic strategist Todd Bennett. “Changing ab-
sentee voting means more Democratic officeholders, which means the ability
to advance progressive causes across the country.” \ Republican critics have
countered that the proposal would distort the vote by giving Democrats an
unfair advantage. “This is a liberal power grab.”
Access + Republican vignette (double-factor, 268 words):
In many states, fewer and fewer voters are having to make the traditional
trip to vote at their polling station. Instead, they are choosing to mail in
an absentee vote before Election Day. \ Starting soon, however, absentee
voting could change. This is because the U.S. is considering a proposal that
would alter some of the technical details of this common electoral proce-
dure. \ If implemented, the proposal is—on balance—expected to have two
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effects. \ First, the proposal would make it easier to vote absentee. \ As
such, voter access advocates are lining up behind the proposal: they have
long believed the current system makes it too hard for well-intentioned indi-
viduals to exercise their right to vote. \ “This proposal would open up the
electoral process,” says John Lange, a proponent of expanded access. “Le-
gitimizing our elections by making voting more convenient is consistent with
America’s larger commitment to equality and inclusion.” \ Advocates of
electoral integrity, however, have countered that the proposal would make it
too hard for election officials to guard against unlawful, fraudulent voting. \
The second expected effect of the proposal is that it would advantage the
Republican Party. \ Republicans, as a result, are on board: they have always
suspected that the current system makes it too hard for their supporters to
vote. \ “This proposal would help us to advance our overall agenda,” says
Republican strategist Todd Bennett. “Changing absentee voting means more
Republican officeholders, which means the ability to advance conservative
causes across the country.” \ Democratic critics have countered that the
proposal would distort the vote by giving Republicans an unfair advantage.
“This is a conservative power grab.”
5.2.2 Survey post-stimulus content
First manipulation check :
According to what you have just read, what electoral rule allows a voter to
cast his or her ballot by mail?
[Absentee voting; Provisional voting; Voter I.D.; Early voting; Don’t know].
The correct answer is ‘Absentee voting’ for all treatment groups.
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Second manipulation check :
Thinking of what you have just read, did the news story indicate whether the
proposal would tend to favor a specific political party over the other?
[The news story says the proposal would favor the Republicans; The news
story says the proposal would favor the Democrats; The news story says the
proposal would favor neither party over the other; The news story did not
provide this information; Don’t know].
The correct answer depends on the treatment group.
Dependent variable:
The news story you have just read was about proposed changes to absentee
voting procedures in the U.S. Thinking back to this article, to what extent
do you support or oppose the proposal?
[Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly dis-
agree]
Debrief :
Dear survey participant, \ Thank you for your participation in this research
study. This message is to provide you with information about the survey
you have completed. \ The purpose of this study is to assess the extent to
which people use their partisan identification and/or their core values to form
opinions on electoral rules and reform. This is why you answered questions
about these predispositions at the beginning of the survey. \ At one point,
you read a short news story on absentee voting. This article was written by
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the investigator to present participants with an electoral reform scenario that
would be valid experimentally. The language and spirit of the news story,
however, is modeled after that of several articles on absentee voting that ran
in national newspapers in the 2000s and 2010s. \ Nevertheless, some content
from the study’s news story was fictitious: \ First, the news story mentioned
that the U.S. is considering an absentee voting reform proposal. \ This was
a fabrication, in two ways. First, each of the fifty states has jurisdiction over
its individual absentee voting procedures. Second, and although a national
program would nonetheless be within the range of permissible federal action
(indeed, in the past, the U.S. government has used grant programs to achieve
electoral rule standardization—for example, after the 2000 election, the Help
America Vote Act), no such proposal is under consideration. \ Second, the
news story (may have) discussed how the proposed grant program would affect
the two major political parties, as well as whether each party supported or
opposed the proposal. \ This, too, was a fabrication. The effects of absentee
voting are not obvious, and scholars still study the extent to which it benefits
either political party. Moreover, and depending on the circumstances, both
Democrats and Republicans have advocated for absentee voting. \ Since this
study utilized deception, you are allowed to withdraw your participation. If
you wish to remove yourself, or if you have any questions about the study in
general, please contact the investigator.
5.2.3 The perceived neutrality of electoral rules
Instructions :
Absentee voting is the focal rule of the research design, not because it is
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particularly interesting, but rather because it does not appear to be obvious
in its partisan advantage. A non-neutral rule, by contrast, would have been
problematic for the project, because it would have increased the likelihood
that subjects could bring outside knowledge and emotion to bear on their
answers to the DV, something that would have contaminated the treatment.
If, for example, the research design had utilized voter I.D. (perceived as bi-
ased), then the answers to the DV would not have isolated the effect of the
treatment, but rather of the treatment plus the contaminant. Rather than
assume that absentee voting is non-salient and neutral, I validated this suppo-
sition via a pilot survey that asked respondents about whether they perceived
absentee voting to be neutral. Other electoral rules were included for compar-
ison. I conceptualize a neutral rule as one for which respondents, on average,
perceive absentee voting as ‘favoring neither’ party (or, also, ‘don’t know’).
Instructions :
Now we will ask you about your thoughts on various electoral procedures used
in the U.S. \ For convenience, we will provide you with a brief definition under
the name of each procedure. \ For each question, we would like you to tell
us whether, in your opinion, the procedure tends to favor the Republicans,
tends to favor the Democrats, or tends to favor neither party over the other.
Rule definitions provided to respondents :
Absentee voting : Allows a voter to cast a ballot by mail if he or she is unable
or unwilling to vote in-person at their polling place.
Voter I.D.: Requires a voter to provide photo identification at his or her
polling place in order to cast a ballot.
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Early voting : Allows a voter to cast an in-person ballot prior to Election Day
at his or her polling place.
Same-day registration: Permits a citizen to register to vote on Election Day
upon arriving at his or her polling place.
Motor voter : Allows a citizen to automatically register to vote when he or
she does business with the Department of Motor Vehicles.
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Rule Sample Percent of group perceiving rule as. . .
Group n FavoringReps.
Favoring
Dems.
Favoring
neither
Don’t
know
Absentee voting
Total 99 10.10% 26.26% 54.55% 9.09%
Dem. 54 7.41% 27.78% 61.11% 3.70%
Ind. 14 0.00% 14.29% 50.00% 35.71%
Rep. 31 19.35% 29.03% 45.16% 6.45%
Voter I.D.
Total 99 44.44% 12.12% 36.36% 7.07%
Dem. 54 53.70% 9.26% 37.04% 0.00%
Ind. 14 21.43% 7.14% 42.86% 28.57%
Rep. 31 38.71% 19.35% 32.26% 9.68%
Early voting
Total 99 8.08% 26.26% 58.59% 7.07%
Dem. 54 5.56% 27.78% 64.81% 1.85%
Ind. 14 0.00% 21.43% 50.00% 28.57%
Rep. 31 16.13% 25.81% 51.61% 6.45%
Same-day
registration
Total 99 5.05% 39.39% 44.44% 11.11%
Dem. 54 3.70% 46.30% 48.15% 1.85%
Ind. 14 0.00% 14.29% 50.00% 35.71%
Rep. 31 9.68% 38.71% 35.48% 16.13%
Motor voter
Total 99 10.10% 28.28% 51.52% 10.10%
Dem. 54 12.96% 29.63% 50.00% 7.41%
Ind. 14 0.00% 14.29% 57.14% 28.57%
Rep. 31 9.68% 32.26% 51.61% 6.45%
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics for the five electoral rules tested
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5.2.4 The effect of partisan self-interest
Notes: ANOVA.1 holds constant the reception of a congruent values factor (V+), allowing the partisan
self-interest factor to vary between incongruent (P–), none, and congruent (P+). Similarly, ANOVA.2
holds constant the reception of an incongruent values factor (V–), again allowing partisan self-interest
to vary. For each test, then, any difference between the groups on mean support for the reform proposal
must be due to the varying ‘P.’ Finally, p-values (Bonferroni corrected, two-tailed) appear above the
dotted lines.
Figure 5.2: The effect of partisan self-interest for Study 1, MTurk sample
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Notes: As noted in Figure 5.2, ANOVA.1 and ANOVA.2 each allow partisan self-interest to vary, but hold
constant the reception of congruent (V+) and incongruent (V–) values factors, respectively. Partisan
self-interest, then, must drive the result. Bonferroni corrected p-values (two-tailed) appear above the
dotted lines.
Figure 5.3: The effect of partisan self-interest for Study 2, SSI compliers only
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5.3 Chapter 4 Appendix
5.3.1 Results for complete exceptionalism battery
The following is the analysis from the main text re-run to include all eight exceptionalism
questions. With the reversed worded items reclaimed, the scale now runs from 0–32. The
results appear to be robust.
Battery Condition Experiment 1 (FRA) Experiment 2 (EVA)
n Mean Range n Mean Range
Special character
Control 258 8.73 0–16 256 8.14 0–16
Treatment 251 7.58 0–16 257 8.34 0–16
Combined 509 8.17 0–16 513 8.24 0–16
Special mission
Control 258 8.03 0–16 256 8.16 0–16
Treatment 251 7.77 0–16 257 8.39 0–16
Combined 509 7.90 0–16 513 8.28 0–16
Exceptionalism
Control 258 16.76 0–32 256 16.30 0–32
Treatment 251 15.35 0–32 257 16.73 0–32
Combined 509 16.07 0–32 513 16.52 0–32
Notes: The scale for each sub-piece of exceptionalism is 0 to 16 points, whereas the full scale for
exceptionalism is 0–32.
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics for exceptionalism, by experiment and condition
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Figure 5.4: Bivariate relationship between exceptionalist attitudes and FRA support
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Figure 5.5: Bivariate relationship between exceptionalist attitudes and EVA support
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Figure 5.6: Relationship between exceptionalism and FRA support, by treatment
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Figure 5.7: Relationship between exceptionalism and EVA support, by treatment
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